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Abstract 
 
 This thesis is composed of three papers aimed at better understanding corporate 
anti-corruption disclosure (hereafter AC disclosure), a relevant, topical, and under-
researched theme. 
 The first paper provides an examination of changes in compliance and the fight 
against corruption at Siemens A.G. over a period of 11 years during which a major 
corruption scandal occurred. Results, which are aligned with legitimacy and media 
agenda setting theories, show that Siemens engaged in substantive and symbolic 
disclosure strategies in response to increased levels of media attention. The second 
paper provides an analysis of the impact of board characteristics on AC disclosure in 
large multinational companies. Results support the arguments of stakeholder-agency 
and resource dependence theories in that firm with more board resources in terms of 
having higher levels of independence and diversity provide higher levels of AC 
disclosure. The third paper builds on prior studies of the market reaction of 
environmental events by analysing the investor response to the release of Transparency 
International’s 2012 and 2014 "Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing the 
World’s Largest Companies" reports. Focusing on U.S companies, the study documents 
a significant negative market reaction to the first report release.  Further, for both 
events, companies with better AC disclosure suffered significantly less negative market 
adjustments, providing evidence that investors are savvy to the regulatory cost 
exposures of the corruption issue.  
 At the theoretical level, this thesis shows that theories previously applied to 
mostly environmental-themed studies are useful in explaining AC disclosure. 
Empirically, the studies provide evidence allowing for a better understanding of AC 
disclosure practices, causes, and consequences. This thesis adds to the scarce literature 
on corporate AC disclosure and provides useful insights for stakeholders directly or 
indirectly influenced by the corporate fight against corruption. 
 
 
 
 
vi 
Resumo 
  
 Esta tese, composta por três artigos, tem como principal objectivo proporcionar 
uma melhor compreensão acerca da divulgação de informação sobre anti-corrupção 
(DAC), um tema relevante, tempestivo e pouco tratado na literatura.  
 O primeiro artigo consiste numa análise das mudanças de divulgação de 
informação sobre compliance e anti-corrupção na Siemens ao longo de um período de 
onze anos durante o qual a empresa enfrentou um escândalo de corrupção. Os 
resultados, alinhados com a legitimacy theory e media agenda setting theory, indicam 
que a Siemens prosseguiu estratégias simbólicas e substantivas de divulgação de 
informação como resposta à atenção dedicada pelos media àquele evento. O segundo 
artigo consiste numa análise do impacto das características dos conselhos de 
administração (CA) sobre a DAC. Os resultados, alinhados com argumentos da 
stakeholder agency theory e da resource dependence theory, evidenciam que empresas 
cujo CA é caracterizado por maior independência e diversidade apresentam maior DAC. 
O terceiro artigo é uma extensão de investigação passada sobre a reação do mercado a 
eventos ambientais e consiste na análise da reação à divulgação dos relatórios 
"Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing the World’s Largest Companies", 
emitidos pela Transparência Internacional em 2012 e 2014. O estudo, centrado em 
empresas americanas, documenta uma reação negativa à divulgação do primeiro 
relatório. Adicionalmente verifica-se, para os dois anos, que empresas com maior DAC 
sofrem reações de mercado significativamente menos negativas, o que indicia 
sensibilidade dos investidores aos custos regulatórios associados a uma maior exposição 
a questões de corrupção. 
 Ao nível teórico, esta tese demonstra a aplicabilidade à DAC, de teorias 
previamente aplicadas à divulgação de matérias sociais e ambientais. Em termos 
empíricos, fornece evidência útil para uma melhor compreensão das práticas, causas e 
consequências da DAC. Esta tese acrescenta à escassa literatura sobre DAC e 
proporciona informação útil para stakeholders direta ou indiretamente influenciados 
pela luta corporativa contra a corrupção. 
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1.1. Introduction 
 In the first decade of the 21
st
 century, a wide range of corporate scandals opened 
the world’s eyes to greed, corruption and business fraud (UNGC, 2015). Although in 
existence for a long time (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Aguilera and Vadera, 2008), 
concern with corruption has had a dramatic ascendance over the past two decades and is 
becoming one of today’s most pressing global and ethical problems (Sanyal and 
Samanta, 2004; Everett et al., 2006; UNGC, 2015) and a major social issue (Ashforth et 
al., 2008). Studies indicate that corruption is widespread in international business 
(Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014). According to the UNGC (2015, p.164)  if corruption 
was an industry, it would be the third world’s largest, corresponding to 5% of global 
GDP or to USD 3 trillion. Fighting corruption has become an integral part of any 
company’s social responsibility (Branco and Delgado, 2012) and it is already 
considered one of the essential pillars of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (KPMG, 
2013). There are many ways to fight corruption but transparency, which is defined by 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) as timely, reliable economic, social and political 
information which is accessible to all stakeholders,
 
is considered one of the most 
important (Klitgaard, 1998; Halter et al., 2009). This thesis aims at a better 
understanding of transparency regarding corporate anti-corruption disclosure (hereafter 
AC disclosure) and on the causes and consequences of that type of social disclosure. 
1.1.1. A brief overview of corruption 
 Corruption has many times been justified as a means to the greater goal of 
creation of economic value, as an unpleasant but necessary response to the weakness 
and venality of governments (Rose-Ackerman, 2002), as a way to avoid bureaucratic 
delays and to motivate bureaucrats to a more efficient work (Mauro, 1995), or as an 
instrument to create an opportunity for ensuring the legitimacy of firms entering foreign 
markets (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Despite that positive view of corruption, there has been 
an intensified awareness among the general public about its negative consequences for 
economic and social development (Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014). According to Hills 
et al. (2009, p.2), corruption is a bottom line issue that affects companies’ ability to 
compete through increased operational costs and greater exposure to legal and 
competitive risks.  Further, corruption cheats disadvantaged populations by diverting 
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resources for critical services like education, clean water, and health care into the 
pockets of dishonest government officials.  Besides causing huge development and 
economic costs, corruption erodes governance and trust, and provides fertile ground for 
social upheaval and extremism (UNGC, 2015, p. 38). 
 Corruption cannot be easily defined as it assumes myriad forms (Wang and 
Rosenau, 2001; Zarb, 2011). For many years, corruption was viewed almost exclusively 
as related to the behaviour of public officers, and existing definitions exhibited that 
public focus: “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997); “acts in 
which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes 
the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001); “illegal payments to a public agent to obtain a 
benefit that may or not be deserved in the absence of payoffs” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997); 
“the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain” (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). Aligned with this view, much of the literature on corruption in the 
social sciences focuses on the public sector (Doh et al., 2003; Hodgson and Shuxia, 
2007) with less attention directed to the private sector (Gopinath, 2008; Branco and 
Delgado, 2012). Although the private sector played an important role in the check of the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the government (Pleskovic and Stiglitz, 1997), it was 
rarely viewed as a source of analysis alone. This bias may be due to the utilitarian 
economical mainstream prejudice against state activity (Hodgson and Shuxia, 2007), or 
the common assumption of more efficient behaviour in the private sector with 
inherently fewer incentives for harmful conduct (Argandoña, 2003). Additionally, 
largely because of data limitations, research on corruption was mostly performed at the 
country as opposed to the firm level (Healy and Serafeim, 2015). 
 Corruption affects private and public organizations alike (Breit, 2010), so 
focusing exclusively on the public sector and at a country level provided only a limited 
perception of the phenomenon. Today, the definition of corruption has become more 
inclusive. For example, Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as “the use 
of entrusted power for private gain”, a definition that includes both corporate and public 
corruption. In academic literature, the number of studies focusing on the private side of 
corruption has also been increasing (Aguilera and Vadera, 2008; Gopinath, 2008; Halter 
et al., 2009; Dion, 2010), but firm level studies still remain a relatively underexplored 
area of research (Gopinath, 2008; Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014; Jong and Ees, 2014; 
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Healy and Serafeim, 2015). 
Hills et al. (2009) assert that corporations are the typical source of bribes, and 
accordingly, an important component in the corruption problem. Furthermore, Healy 
and Serafeim (2015) argue that it is at the company level where most corruption 
questions remain unanswered. The recent corporate scandals involving large 
multinational companies including Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, and others (Hodgson 
and Shuxia, 2007; Choudhary, 2012) has brought to light corruption within 
organizations and provide additional evidence of why corruption should not be confined 
to the public or country levels (Hodgson and Shuxia, 2007). 
1.1.2. Negative effects of corruption to corporations 
 There is a strong business case encouraging companies to fight corruption (Hess, 
2009) because it may directly and indirectly affect firm profits. Several studies show 
that corruption has a negative impact on sales (Gaviria, 2002; World Bank, 2003), and 
that it may be associated with increased operational costs (Errath et al., 2005).  
Corruption also leads to costs associated with managerial misconduct resulting from the 
lower regulatory oversight typical in corrupted organizations (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These costs include bribes, penalties, and fines (Argandoña, 2001; Doh et al., 
2003). Furthermore, corruption is related to reputational, legal, and competitive risks 
(Hess, 2009). Companies that are engaged in unethical business practices are exposed to 
serious reputational risks and in many cases face negative consequences just from being 
accused of corruption-related infringements (Hills et al., 2009). Organizational 
corruption prevents companies from fulfilling its objectives (Hodgson and Shuxia, 
2007), yet in many organizations it is still viewed as a short term competitive necessity 
(Hess, 2009). 
 Despite its negative impacts, implementing measures to deter corruption seems 
almost as difficult as providing a definition of the phenomenon (Zarb, 2011). 
Transparency regarding anti-corruption is considered by many one of the most 
important ways to fight corruption (Wilkinson, 2006; Halter et al., 2009; Transparency 
International, 2009; UNGC, 2009) and it is the focus of this thesis. 
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1.2. Corporate AC Disclosure, the research topic 
 Several institutions believe that the degree of reporting on anti-corruption can be 
a strong indicator of the quality and comprehensiveness of a company’s efforts in 
addressing bribery and corruption (Transparency International, 2009; UNGC, 2009). 
According to Hess (2009), disclosure on corruption serves multiple goals: it helps to 
provide accountability with respect to performance; it raises public awareness and 
pressures other companies to adopt AC principles; it serves the goal of organizational 
learning by providing a deeper understanding of what works in the fight against 
corruption and which developments are most needed. Disclosure is a way to ensure that 
managers are held accountable to the public. Disclosure makes corrupting acts more 
risky and less attractive, cooperation more easy to sustain, and opportunistic rent 
seeking less likely (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). It is expected that strengthening AC 
disclosure decreases the possibility of corruption events, but it also has a reverse side, 
such as opportunity costs in spending resources in informing the public and relevant 
stakeholders (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009, p. 525).  
 Despite the growing pressure of society and governments to increase 
transparency regarding anti-corruption (Halter et al., 2009) AC disclosure has received 
much less academic attention than other social responsibility issues such as the 
environment (Wilkinson, 2006). Justifications for the shortage of attention lie not only 
on a lack of perception about the importance of such disclosure but also on the secret, 
hidden nature of corruption which makes the issue sensitive for companies (ibid.). The 
few studies that have been performed tend to show that AC disclosure is still not 
satisfactory (Gordon and Wynhoven, 2003; Novethic, 2006; Transparency International, 
2009; Branco and Delgado, 2012). Furthermore, most of the existing studies are non-
academic and focus on companies’ practices without examining the factors influencing 
it (Branco and Delgado, 2012). To date, only three academic studies (Islam and 
Mathews, 2009; Dissanayake et al., 2011; Healy and Serafeim, 2015) address practices 
and/or causes of corporate AC disclosure.  
 In this thesis, three papers are presented each providing different views of 
corporate AC disclosure practices, causes, and/or consequences. The first paper offers 
an analysis of the AC disclosure practices of Siemens AG, a large multinational 
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company, as a reaction to a major corruption scandal. The second study investigates 
how board characteristics influence the AC disclosure of large multinational firms. The 
third paper focuses on a sample of U.S firms and examines the market reaction to the 
first ever Transparency International firm level report on AC disclosure (and a 
subsequent update of that report). Detailed motivations for the research are presented in 
Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 provides a detailed analysis of the thesis structure. 
1.3. Motivations for the research  
 Four main reasons motivated the decision to research AC disclosure at the firm 
level: the relevance and opportunity of the theme, the deemed interest for a wide range 
of stakeholders, the present dearth of research, and the increased call for studies about 
AC disclosure.  
 
Relevance and opportunity of the theme 
 Though some authors advocate its advantages, the most widely accepted take on 
corruption is that it is a serious economic, social, political, and moral blight 
(Argandoña, 2007) with detrimental global effects (UNGC, 2015). Besides being a 
fascinating and motivating theme, corruption is in the spotlight. Corruption related 
scandals have risen significantly in the recent past (Wang and Rosenau, 2001) with 
strong impacts on businesses and society in general (UNGC, 2015). These significant 
past events have put corruption on the top of the agenda of companies, governments, 
NGO’s and the general public (KPMG, 2011).  
 
It is a theme with a wide stakeholder impact  
 Strong relationships with stakeholders can only be built if companies 
deliberately disclose the information stakeholders seek in order to provide reassurance 
that the firm is trustworthy (Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005, p.9). By providing a better 
understanding of AC disclosure, its causes, and its consequences, this thesis should 
prove useful to several key stakeholders. 
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 Corporate disclosure, through regulated financial reports, voluntary 
communication, or information provided by external intermediaries, is critical for the 
functioning of capital markets because it helps mitigate existing information and 
incentive problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Corruption-related events may impact 
cash flows and risk (Lee and Ng, 2006; Hess, 2009), the two main aspects taken into 
consideration in investment decisions according to classical finance (Aaker and 
Jacobson, 1987). Additionally, there is a growing concern about the financial impacts of 
non-financial aspects of business such as corruption. Particularly over the past two 
decades, investors have increasingly included environmental, social, and governance 
factors as part of their financial analysis (UNGC, 2015).  Hence, understanding the 
impact of corruption, a socially important issue, will likely be very important for current 
and potential  shareholders.  
 AC disclosure is often dependent on the discretionary decision of managers, but 
social issues including corruption are increasingly present in corporate boardrooms 
(Elkington, 2006). Given their involvement in the decision process regarding what to 
divulge and when, managers and board members may also benefit from a better 
understanding of AC disclosure and of factors influencing the practice. If AC disclosure 
serves to increase learning, as suggested by Hess (2009), understanding how a leading 
multinational company like Siemens used AC disclosure to deal with a severe 
corruption-related scandal could provide meaningful insights to managers and board 
members.  Additionally, if managers act as true agents of shareholders, then it may be 
important for them to understand the wealth effects of AC disclosure. Furthermore, 
managers today are themselves more exposed to risks, so their compliance and, I argue, 
disclosure efforts, are not just about protecting the business and its shareholders, but 
also about protecting themselves (EY, 2014). Understanding practices and incentives 
regarding AC disclosure is important to guide managers and board members through 
specific corruption-related events and through their discretionary decisions on the 
adequate levels of AC practices and disclosure.   
 Institutions fighting corruption may also benefit from AC disclosure studies 
because understanding companies’ practices, motivations for AC disclosure, and the 
practice’s consequences may help them to identify what works and what doesn’t in the 
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fight against corruption.  They can accordingly adjust their efforts to achieve greater 
success (Wilkinson, 2008).  
 
Present dearth of empirical studies on firm level AC Disclosure 
 AC disclosure is considered one of the areas in the fight against corruption in 
need of more development (Hess, 2009). Whereas corporate social disclosure (CSD), in 
general, has received considerable attention (Frost et al., 2005; Coetzee and van Staden, 
2011, p.3), most of the past CSD research focuses on environmental-related topics. 
Studies of the impact of specific environmental events on CSD (e.g., Patten, 1992; 
Jantadej and Kent, 1999; Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000; Savage, Rowlands and 
Cataldo, 2000; Cho, 2009) and on the market impacts of environmental CSD (e.g., 
Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Patten and Freedman, 2008; Flammer, 2013) are 
abundant.  There is a consensus that only limited attention has been dedicated to other 
themes with the social arena (Islam and Mathews, 2009; Coetzee and van Staden, 
2011).  
 Focusing more specifically on corruption, most of the past research is non-
academic (Branco and Delgado, 2012), performed at the country level (Svensson, 
2000), and focused on the relationship between AC and macro-economic aspects (Healy 
and Serafeim, 2015), such as growth (Mauro, 1995), economic freedom (Nwabuzor, 
2005), political and civil freedom (Svensson, 2000; Svensson, 2005; Baughn et al., 
2007), or foreign direct investment (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). Despite the recent 
increase of attention regarding the organizational side of corruption (Branco and 
Delgado, 2012), the firm-level perspective remains a relatively underexplored area of 
research (Gopinath, 2008; Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014; Jong and Ees, 2014). 
 Within this domain, most existing studies provide theoretical approaches for a 
better understanding of corporate corruption (Anand et al., 2004; Argandoña, 2005; 
Aguilera and Vadera, 2008; Pinto et al., 2008; Jong and Ees, 2014) or relate to 
corporate corruption only with respect ethics (Zekos, 2004) or to firm performance 
(Cosenz and Noto, 2014). A few others examine corporate corruption and its relation to 
the profile of national institutions (Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Jeong and Weiner, 2012), 
to subsidiaries’ practices such as employing a local partner in high corruption risk 
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countries (Spencer and Gomez, 2011), to companies’ bargaining power (Svensson, 
2003), and to financial market reactions (Rao and Hamilton, 1996).  
 With respect to AC disclosure, most past studies consist of surveys produced by 
professional organizations such as PWC (2008), KPMG (2008), EY (2014) or Dow 
Jones (2015) and describe companies’ practices, but not reasons for, or consequences 
of, AC disclosure. Most of these non-academic studies show that despite the 
improvement in companies attempts to address corruption (Dow Jones, 2015), reporting 
is still not satisfactory (Branco and Delgado, 2012). The limited academic 
investigations of AC disclosure include Islam et al. (Forthcoming) and Dissanayake et 
al. (2011), both of which  analyse the disclosure practices of telecommunication 
companies and show an increase in AC disclosure as a consequence of corruption 
related events which received a significant amount of media attention. A thorough 
review of the CSR literature indicates that Healy and Serafeim (2005) is the only 
academic study to date examining the causes and consequences of AC disclosure. Their 
study provides evidence that firms’ self-reported anti-corruption efforts are related to 
enforcement instruments, monitoring costs, industry and country corruption risks and to 
greater board independence. They also show that firms with higher AC disclosures have 
lower subsequent corruption allegations in the media.     
Finally, despite the intense debate about whether firms are rewarded by the 
market for being socially responsible (e.g., Ruf et al., 2001; Patten, 2008; Guidry and 
Patten, 2010; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2012), relatively little effort has been directed at  
evaluating corruption and related events’ implications in terms of financial performance 
at the firm-level (Cosenz and Noto, 2014; Donadelli et al., 2014). 
 
Increased claim for AC Disclosure studies 
 There is a growing call for research into AC disclosure (Branco and Delgado, 
2012). Some authors consider that corruption is still a neglected social issue among 
CSR priorities (Hills et al., 2009) and that CSR issues with a potentially large impact on 
market functioning, such as corruption, should get a more prominent place on the CSR 
agenda (Weyzig, 2009). Despite the popularity of the transparency concept, the link 
between corruption and transparency is far from being thoroughly explored (Kaufmann 
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and Bellver, 2005; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Studies decomposing the generic notion of 
transparency into specific components so as to provide useful tools for policy advise 
and interventions are almost non-existent (Kaufmann and Bellver, 2005). Regarding 
corruption, firm level studies are still at a formative stage, so there are many questions 
left to answer (Healy and Serafeim, 2015).  
1.4. Thesis structure 
 With the intent to provide a better understanding of AC disclosure and of its 
causes and consequences, three papers were developed that are believed offer diversity 
across four main areas: research themes/perspective, data collection methods, 
methodological approach and theoretical background. 
 The first paper is presented in Section 2. This paper provides an examination the 
changes in compliance and AC disclosure practices at Siemens AG—a large German 
multinational corporation - over a period of 11 years during which a major corruption 
scandal occurred.  Through a content analysis of the company’s annual reports and 
sustainability reports from 2000 to 2011 and under the lens of legitimacy theory and 
media agenda setting theory, our findings suggest that Siemens changed its compliance 
and corruption disclosure practices to manage its legitimacy in the wake of the 2006 
corruption scandal and in subsequent years.  The strategies adopted by Siemens may be 
described as both symbolic and substantive (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990). The implications of this study may be useful for several key societal 
stakeholders in that they provide additional arguments for the need for better regulations 
to ensure AC disclosure of relevant, reliable, and consistent corporate information about 
important social issues such as corruption. 
 The second paper, presented in Section 3, consists of a study regarding the 
influence of board characteristics on AC disclosure. Using used data provided by 
Transparency International about AC disclosure efforts by large multinational firms 
(Transparency International, 2012) and an ordinal regression this paper analyses the 
impact of board characteristics on AC disclosure by large multinational firms. The 
study also considers certain corporate characteristics and the business culture of the 
country of origin. Based on the analysis that combines stakeholder-agency theory and 
resource-dependence theory, we suggest that boards characterized by higher levels of 
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independence, knowledge, and diversity are more likely to present higher levels of AC 
disclosure than their counterparts. Our findings suggest to some extent that companies 
with better board resources provide higher levels of AC disclosure. More concretely, 
results show that boards with a higher proportion of independent members and with 
more diversity provide higher AC Disclosure. This information could be useful for 
boards to better understand how their own structure may influence AC disclosure, but 
even more so for regulators in the sense that it may be necessary to provide additional 
guidelines regarding board composition to ensure higher levels of AC disclosure. 
 The third paper, presented in Section 4, provides an analysis of the investor 
response to the release of TI’s 2012 and 2014 "Transparency in Corporate Reporting: 
Assessing the World’s Largest Companies" reports. These were TI’s first firm-level 
reports, and given the organization’s standing as a leading contributor to the fight 
against corruption, it is argued the reports could be expected to potentially increase 
regulatory cost exposures for affected firms.  The study builds on prior U.S.-based 
studies of market reactions to environmental-related cost inducing events.  Focusing on 
only U.S companies, evidence is provided indicating a significant negative market 
reaction to the first report release.  The mean market response to the 2014 report release 
was not statistically significant.  However, and consistent with the prior environmental-
themed studies, we find that differences in political cost exposure, in this case, 
differences in AC disclosure ratings, appear to impact the market reactions.  For each of 
the report releases, companies with better AC disclosure suffered significantly less 
negative market adjustments. This study thus provides evidence that investors are savvy 
to the political cost exposures of the corruption issue.  
 The three studies use differing theoretical backgrounds, data sources, and 
methods  (see Table 1.1). It is believed that this diversity enriches this thesis and allows 
for a deeper understanding of the technical, methodological, and theoretical 
complexities of this specific aspect of CSD. 
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Table 1.1 - Comparison between the three essays presented in Sections 2 to 4. 
 Paper 1 | Chapter 2 (a) Paper 2 | Chapter 3 (b) Paper 3 | Chapter 4  Global Contribution 
Evidence presented in Paper 1 
shows that Siemens A.G. used 
symbolic and substantive strategies 
in an attempt to manage its 
legitimacy when faced with a severe 
corruption scandal that raised 
considerable media attention. Paper 
2 demonstrates that boards with 
better resources in terms of 
independence, diversity are likely to 
present higher levels of AC 
disclosure. Focusing on a sample of 
U.S companies, paper 3 provides 
evidence that investors negatively 
value exposure to potential 
regulatory costs arising from the 
release of TI’s first firm-level 
corruption reports.  
Paper 
Title 
“In Search of Disclosure 
Effects of the Siemens 
AG’S Corruption Scandal” 
“Board characteristics and 
anti-corruption disclosure in 
large multinational 
companies” 
“Market reactions to 
Transparency International 
Reports on corporate Anti-
corruption disclosure” 
Purpose Reaction to a major 
corruption related event 
through AC disclosure  
Relation between board 
characteristics and AC 
disclosure  
Financial markets negative 
reactions to two TI firm level 
reports in anticipation of 
increased regulatory costs  
Focus Analyze company 
practices when facing a 
negative event  
Analyze board characteristics 
as a possible cause for higher 
levels of AC disclosure:  
Analyse market consequences of 
AC disclosure which may be 
incentives for different future 
levels of AC disclosure 
Theory Legitimacy Theory; Media 
Agenda Setting Theory 
Stakeholder Theory and 
Resource-Dependence 
Theory 
Prior empirical studies on the 
effect of potential regulatory 
costs over financial markets 
Data 
Source 
Financial and 
Sustainability Reports; 
Factiva Database 
Annual Proxy Statements, 
Company Website; Osiris 
Database; TI Reports 
DATASTREAM; Lexis Nexis 
Database; Transparency 
international Reports 
Method Content Analysis Ordinal logistic regression Linear regression; Market model 
 
(a) Paper presented at French CSEAR Conference - Montpellier 2-3 May 2013; 36th EAA Annual Congress – Paris, 6-8 May 2013; Interdisciplinary Insights on 
Fraud and Corruption, Porto, 13-15 September, 2012. To be submitted to publication until end of 2015. 
(b) Portuguese CSEAR Conference – Leiria, Portugal, 6-7 November 2014; Shadow Economy - Multiple Perspectives of the Shadow Economy, 13-15 
September. 2014. Paper submitted to the Journal of Business Ethics. 
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SIEMENS A.G. CORRUPTION SCANDAL 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
IN SEARCH OF THE DISCLOSURE EFFECTS OF THE SIEMENS A.G. 
CORRUPTION SCANDAL 
ABSTRACT 
In this study, we examine the changes in disclosure practices at Siemens AG—a large 
German multinational corporation, on compliance and the fight against corruption over 
a period of 11 years during which the company faced a major corruption scandal. In 
2006 the company was accused of paying an estimated amount of bribes of $1.4 billion 
(SEC, 2008). This particular scandal led to several other incidents of an identical nature 
as well as a number of additional investigations. As of 2011, the company paid to the 
American and German governments a total of $1.6 billion in fines (SEC, 2011). 
Through a content analysis of the company’s annual reports, sustainability reports and 
corporate press releases from 2000 to 2011 and under the lens of legitimacy theory and 
media agenda setting theory, our findings suggest that Siemens changed its compliance 
and corruption disclosure practices to manage its legitimacy in the wake of the 2006 
corruption scandal and in subsequent years.  The strategies adopted by Siemens may be 
described as both symbolic and substantive (see Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990; Rodrigue et al., 2013).  The implications emanating from this study 
seem therefore relevant for several key societal stakeholders in that they could at least 
provide additional arguments for the need of better regulations to ensure the disclosure 
of relevant, reliable and consistent corporate information about important social issues 
such as corruption—a serious economic, social, political and moral issue (Argandoña, 
2007). 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; corruption; disclosure; legitimacy 
management; Siemens; substantive; symbolic; United Nations Global Compact 
____________________________________________________________________
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2.1. Introduction 
 This study examines the changes in corporate disclosure practices of a specific 
and under-researched area of corporate social responsibility (CSR), that of countering 
corruption.  There seems to have a consensus that corruption is a cancer that destroys 
society (Rose-Ackerman, 2002) as it facilitates cheating disadvantaged populations by 
diverting resources for critical services like education, clean water, and health care into 
the pockets of dishonest government officials (Hills et al., 2009).   Corruption is often 
also negative for business as it affects a company’s ability to compete and brings 
operational costs such as those associated with a heightened legal risk (ibid.).  
 Disclosure on corruption issues serves multiple goals—it helps to hold managers 
and companies accountable concerning performance on its anti corruption efforts, raises 
public awareness, exhorts pressure towards the adoption of similar principles and 
procedures by other companies and is a means to understand what works in the combat 
against corruption and which developments are most needed (Hess, 2009). 
 Despite the importance of countering corruption, CSR research has traditionally 
been focusing on issues such as environmental protection, health and safety at work, 
and local community and consumer relations (Branco and Delgado, 2012).  It was only 
in 2002 that this issue was considered by the Global Reporting Initiative in its 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 2002), and only in June 2004 that the fight 
against corruption was added as the 10
th
  principle of the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC, 2009).
1
  This suggests that combating corruption in all its forms has 
only recently become an integral part of CSR policies.  
 Although several studies investigate the effects of specific events on corporate 
social disclosure (CSD) practices, most of this literature focuses on environmental, as 
opposed to social disclosure (Patten, 1992; Jantadej and Kent, 1999; Deegan et al., 
2000; Savage et al., 2000; Cho, 2009). Exceptions include Coetzee and van Staden 
(2011) study of South African mining companies response to a mining accident and  
Islam and Mathews (2009) study of Grameen Bank changes in disclosure after severe 
                                                 
1
 The United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative are known to be the two of the 
most important CSR global movements. 
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criticism from the Wall Street Journal in 2001, both social events that received high 
public attention.  
 Similarly, while there is a wealth of non-academic investigations of anti-
corruption disclosure, these rely mostly on companies’ practices and place little 
emphasis on the factors explaining why this type of disclosure is produced (Gordon and 
Wynhoven, 2003; Novethic, 2006; KPMG, 2008; Transparency International, 2009; 
Transparency International, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, only three academic 
studies specifically examine the disclosure of corruption related matters, one related to 
factors influencing AC disclosure (Healy and Serafeim, 2015) and two related with the 
impact of bribery related events over disclosure (Dissanayake et al., 2011; Islam et al., 
Forthcoming). The latter studies will be addressed in more detailed in the literature 
review section. 
 Despite the scarcity of academic inquiries concerning AC disclosure, several 
institutions claim that the degree of reporting on corruption can be a strong indicator of 
the quality and comprehensiveness of a company’s efforts in addressing bribery and 
corruption (Transparency International, 2009; UNGC, 2009). This paper addresses the 
existing gap in the literature. 
 In this study, we examine the changes in disclosure practices on compliance and 
the fight against corruption at Siemens A.G. (hereafter “Siemens”) - a large German 
multinational corporation - over a period of 12 years (2000-2011) during which a major 
corruption scandal occurred. In 2006 the company was accused paying an estimated 
amount of bribes of $1.4 billion (SEC, 2008). This particular scandal led to several 
other incidents of an identical nature as well as a number of investigations that have yet 
to be finalized.  As of 2011, the company paid to the American and German 
governments a total of $1.6 billion in fines (SEC, 2011). We conducted a content 
analysis of the company’s annual reports and sustainability reports from 2000 to 2011 to 
specifically examine the changes in extensiveness and breadth of Siemens’ corruption 
and compliance disclosure.  Relying on arguments from legitimacy theory and media 
agenda setting theory, we find evidence that Siemens appeared to change its compliance 
and corruption disclosure practices to repair its legitimacy in the wake of the 2006 
corruption scandal and in subsequent years with almost no evidence of legitimacy-
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gaining strategies following another event that could have influenced Siemens AC 
disclosure: the issuance of the 10
th
 principle of the United Nations Global Compact (of 
which Siemens is a member since 2003).  The strategies adopted by Siemens may be 
described both as symbolic and substantive (see Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990; Rodrigue et al., 2013).  We also find that disclosure trends differ 
across sustainability and annual reports relative to media attention directly following the 
2006 corruption scandal.  Annual reports show increased disclosure on corruption and 
compliance issues earlier than sustainability reports and these increases occur before the 
peak levels of media attention.  
 In the following section, we present the theoretical lens of our analysis.  Section 
2.3 provides some background information about the Siemens case and lays out the 
research methods.  The analysis and the results are presented in section 2.4.  We discuss 
our findings, limitations and implications, and conclude in the final section.  
2.2. Theoretical framework 
2.2.1. Legitimacy theory 
Proponents of legitimacy theory argue that firms exist as a part of a broader 
system that determines whether the companies are legitimate and thus grants the license 
to operate within that system (Deegan, 2002).  Legitimacy can be viewed as a social 
contract between the firm and society.  The central issue is that society may revoke this 
contract if the company is perceived as falling short of public expectations (Dowling 
and Pfeffer, 1975; Deegan and Rankin, 1996).  Evidence of such a rupture can be 
illustrated through stakeholders reducing or eliminating the supply of labor and 
financial capital to firms, or constituents lobbying the government for increased taxes, 
fines or laws to encourage the reduction of those actions which do not conform to the 
community’s expectations (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Deegan and Rankin, 1996).  
When an actual or potential disparity emerges between the two value systems—that of 
society and of the company, the entity’s legitimacy is threatened (ibid.). 
According to legitimacy theory, social disclosure is a tool utilized by companies 
to legitimize their behaviours vis-à-vis their stakeholder groups.  The majority of studies 
that use legitimacy theory as a theoretical framework suggest that it provides an 
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explanatory basis for changes in disclosure (Patten, 1992; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Buhr, 1998; O'Donovan, 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Patriotta et al., 2011).  
Some, however, suggest that legitimacy theory cannot systematically explain social 
disclosures (Guthrie and Parker, 2006). 
2.2.2. Media agenda setting theory 
We bring in features of media agenda setting theory to complement legitimacy 
theory. Legitimacy theory posits that the extent of social disclosure is a function of 
public policy pressures faced by the company (Patten, 1992; Cho et al., 2010), so one 
can expect a positive relationship between media pressure and disclosure.  Before 
companies employ deliberate legitimacy strategies, management must first have access 
to the nature and scope of the comments expressed by the public opinion which exist in 
the media (Cormier et al., 2005). 
According to media agenda setting theory, the media drives, shapes and creates 
the public’s agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972).  This is primarily due to increased 
media attention, which helps trigger public awareness, and magnifies the issues under 
its attention so that they become a top concern (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Brown and 
Deegan, 1998).  Several authors (Patten, 2002a) use media agenda setting theory in 
conjunction with legitimacy theory (see Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Elijido-Ten, 2011) with some 
providing evidence that increased environmental disclosure can be a result of higher 
media exposure (as in Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Cormier et al., 
2005; Aerts and Cormier, 2009) and that disclosure is used as a means to reduce public 
policy pressure (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Patten, 2002a).   
2.2.3. Reactions to legitimacy gaps 
Companies use strategies to influence societal perceptions when legitimacy gaps 
emerge.  External perceptions of legitimacy may change in the advent of threats due to 
specific events (Patten, 1991; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000) such as 
changes in the community’s expectations (Lindbloom, 1994), changes in the 
composition and/or values of the public (O'Donovan, 2002) or the occurrence of 
incidents (Deegan et al., 2000).  The specific strategy to adopt highly depends on 
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whether the company is trying to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy (O'Donovan, 
2002).  The primary difference between legitimacy gaining and repairing strategies is 
that the latter are reactive in response to a crisis, whereas the former are usually 
proactive, generally not in response to a crisis and ex ante (ibid.).  Hence, for the 
purposes of this study, proactive refers to a more timely reaction in response to a 
situation whereas a reactive response occurs later. 
Based on the work of Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, 
p.178-181) presented a comprehensive list of possible substantive and symbolic 
reactions to threats to legitimacy.  Symbolic strategies occur when the company does 
not make real changes but tries to portray itself as legitimate so as to meet society’s 
expectations.  Examples of such strategies are:   
 espousing socially acceptable goals while pursuing less acceptable ones; 
 denying or suppressing information about activities that may undermine 
legitimacy (see also Suchman, 1995); 
 redefining means and ends by, for instance, identifying with symbols, values, or 
institutions that are highly legitimate (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975); 
 offering accounts or explanations, including excuses and justifications, as a way 
to minimize responsibility and reduce negative consequences for the company 
(see also Suchman, 1995); 
 offering apologies and thus showing remorse about unacceptable behavior;   
 performing ceremonial conformity by adopting practices with high visibility 
without actually making structural and procedural  changes in the organization. 
Savage et al. (2000) added the following three strategies based on their empirical work: 
 admitting guilt and assuming responsibility for the facts that caused a negative 
impact on the company’s legitimacy; 
 creating misinterpretations or distortions by giving false impressions or 
accounts, or by providing misleading information whether intentional or not; 
 evading, trivializing or skirting around the issue by, for instance, offering partial 
explanations, trivializing or not directly addressing the issue. 
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Suchman (1995) suggests that legitimacy repairing strategies may first consist of 
constructing a wall that allows the audience to separate past events from ongoing 
activities by using the equivalent to what the above authors referred to as symbolic 
legitimacy management.  In the second stage, the focus may turn to engaging in real 
strategic restructuring.  Other examples of substantive strategies are evidenced by 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 178-181) and comprise: 
 role performing and meeting its constituents’ expectations;  
 engaging in coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) through 
conformity to values, norms and expectations of its constituents; 
 altering resource dependencies; 
 altering socially institutionalized practices so that they conform to companies 
practices. 
According to Zyglidopoulos (2001), accidents and discrete one-time undesirable 
or unfortunate events that happen unexpectedly in the life of corporations and cause 
damage to any number or kind of stakeholders may particularly damage a company’s 
reputation. Damage to companies reputation may happen because: (1) stakeholders react 
emotionally to accidents, or evaluate them as events which provide relevant information 
about the company’s business and their stakes in it and (2) accidents trigger 
investigations and thus increased social concern and public attention. Furthermore, 
factors such as the severity of the accident and the extent of damages are expected to 
play an important role in the level of impact on the company’s reputation (ibid.). We 
argue that events under investigations can be particularly harmful as they may reveal 
even more embarrassing facts.  Regarding Siemens 2006 corruption scandal, the 
company was under investigation in a number of different countries, involved several 
stakeholders (employees, management and suppliers for instance) and received 
significant media attention. We can then expect this event to be particularly harmful to 
the company reputation.  
 Previous literature on the impact of events on company’s legitimacy and 
disclosure is focused mainly on environmental incidents or events (Patten, 1992; 
Deegan et al., 2000; Branco et al., 2008; Coetzee and van Staden, 2011). To our 
knowledge only two studies addressed the impact of corruption related events on 
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corporate disclosure (Dissanayake et al., 2011; Islam et al., Forthcoming). Islam et. al 
(Forthcoming) analyzed anti-bribery disclosure of two Chinese multinational companies 
– China Mobile and ZTE – as a consequence of increased global concern over the issue 
of bribery in the telecommunication industry. Dissanayake et al. (2011) performed an 
exploratory analysis of the extent of anti-bribery disclosure at Alcatel-Lucent and 
Siemens A.G., over a period of 15 years, in response to incidents of corporate bribery 
and under the influence of media pressure and increased International Governmental 
Organization (IGO’s) anti-bribery activity. Both studies concluded for an increase in 
corporate disclosure in reaction to a legitimacy-threatening event and under increased 
media pressure. Despite also focusing on Siemens disclosure practices, our study 
substantially differs from that of Dissanayake et al. (2011) in terms of scope of analysis, 
research methods and theoretical lenses. 
2.3. Background and research methods 
2.3.1. Background 
In November 2006, Munich public prosecutors conducted searches at the 
company and employees’ private homes in an attempt to discover evidence concerning 
suspicions of public corruption including embezzlement, bribery, money laundering and 
tax evasion.  As a result, the company incurred a fine of 201€ million in October 2007.  
According to the court’s final disposition, former manager of the communications group 
colluded with others and bribed foreign public officials for the purpose of obtaining 
contracts on behalf of the company in Russia, Nigeria and Libya, which totaled 77 cases 
during the period from 2001 to 2004 (Siemens, 2008, p.275). Investigations by the 
Munich public prosecutor continued throughout 2006 and involved several companies 
from the Siemens group in several geographical areas—Germany, Greece, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein and Italy.  Some of the cases, which led to these investigations dated back 
to 2004 and 2005.  In 2007 new corruption allegations appeared, involving Siemens 
companies in China, Hungary, Indonesia, Nigeria, Norway and the United States.  In 
December 2008, legal proceedings against the company’s Supervisory and Managing 
Board from the Munich legal prosecutor in Germany and the United States were 
terminated with the imposition of an additional fine of 395€ million.  
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Several other anticorruption investigations continued or started after 2009 in 
Russia, Austria, Brazil, Greece and Afghanistan, among other countries.  Most of these 
legal proceedings were related to events that occurred before 2006 but were only 
uncovered after the 2006 scandal or as a result of its investigation.  Hence, the post-
event period considered in this study is not exempt from corruption-related situations.   
To fully comprehend the problem, we analyzed the annual reports, stand-alone 
sustainability reports and corporate press releases issued by Siemens from 2000 to 2011, 
period of 6 years before and after the event.  
When reviewing Siemens reports in the years previous to 2006 we realized that 
another corruption related event had occurred, which might have an impact on 
disclosure: the issuance of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) 10
th
 principle 
on the fight against corruption, in 2004. The UNGC is “an international voluntary 
network-based initiative consisting of participants from companies, NGOs, 
governments, academic institutions and other stakeholder groups” (Runhaar and 
Lafferty, 2009, p.481).  Until 2004 the UNGC was focused on nine principles 
concerning Human Rights, Labor and Environment.  In June 2004, a 10
th
 principle on 
anticorruption was issued stating that “businesses should work against all forms of 
corruption, including extortion and bribery” (UNGC, 2009).  Given that this event was 
also related to corruption and that it might have influenced Siemens disclosure in the 
pre-event period we included it in our analysis. 
To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the problem, we analyzed the 
annual reports, stand-alone sustainability reports issued by Siemens based on the 
following timeline: 
 2000 to 2003: pre-event period 1 (Period 1); 
 2004 to 2005: pre-event period 2, consisting on year when the UNGC issued its 
10
th
 principle on anticorruption and the subsequent year (Period 2); 
 2006 to 2008: time period from when the first corruption scandal emerged to its 
last fine settlement (Period 3); and 
 2009 to 2011: post-event period during which the company kept undergoing 
through corruption related situations. 
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 For the event and pre-event periods we also analysed Siemens corporate press 
releases. Analysing pre- and post-event periods is a widely used procedure (Patten, 
1992), which allows for an analysis of the increase in disclosure over time, and more 
specifically disclosure in reaction to specific events (see Deegan et al., 2000; Branco et 
al., 2008; Cho, 2009). 
2.3.2. Content analysis 
We use content analysis—a method commonly applied in CSR reporting 
research (Gray et al., 1995; Coetzee and van Staden, 2011) to examine the annual 
reports, stand-alone sustainability reports  and corporate press releases available on 
Siemens’ website.  We measured disclosure extensiveness with the number of 
sentences
2
 (e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Deegan et al., 2000; Deegan et 
al., 2002; Branco et al., 2008) related to compliance and corruption while breadth was 
measured through disclosure indexes (e.g. Gul and Leung, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009).  Disclosure scores 
were computed by assigning a score of “1” if a particular category was disclosed and 
“0” otherwise.  Consistent with Branco and Rodrigues (2008) and Cho and Patten 
(2007), we made the assumption that each item of disclosure was equally relevant and 
added the disclosure scores rather than weighting them.  We also supplemented the 
quantitative analysis with qualitative data from the reports.  
Given that compliance and corruption disclosure item scoring grids have not 
been used in prior studies, we developed our own specific disclosure index based on, 
and adapted from, established related sources.  The starting point was the “Reporting 
Elements for the 10
th
 principle” to which we added additional elements and sub-
elements from the following sources: (1) the Novethic (2006) study, (2) (Transparency 
International, 2009) and (Transparency International, 2012) and studies and (3) the 
GRI’s key performance indicators (GRI, 2002). Table 2.1 presents the final Disclosure 
Index used to analyze the content of Siemens’ annual reports and stand-alone 
sustainability reports from 2000 to 2011. The Index is composed of 5 Categories: 
                                                 
2
 While the number of words or the number or percentages of pages (Gray et al., 1995) are also both 
widely used in CSD research, Hackston and Milne (1996) suggest that sentence counts are preferable 
because they convey a better meaning and may generate fewer errors (Milne and Adler, 1998). 
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commitment and policy, risk management, implementation, monitoring and key 
performance indications. The index maximum score is 33. 
Table 2.1 Disclosure Index Composition and Scores 
 
 
2.3.3. Media attention 
Media attention (or exposure) is traditionally measured by counting the number 
of media press releases or reports in specific newspapers (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008) 
or in media databases (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Coetzee and van Staden, 2011) 
through a keyword search.  We used FACTIVA database and measured media attention 
by the number of headline news for the words (1) “Siemens” and “Compliance and (2) 
“Siemens” and “Corruption”. 
CATEGORY SCORE ELEMENT SUB-ELEMENT (where relevant)
COMMITMENT & 
POLICY
1
Commitment compliance/anti-
corruption
Public commitment to fight corruption
Carrying out risk assessment 
Policies/rules for high-risk areas 
Risks according to stakeholders
Corporate structure 
Programmes, processes, Code of Conduct, rules,...
Communication on the commitment to all employees
Existing training
Incentive related scheme
Other processes employee oriented amnesty programs inquiries, conferences)
Existence of communication/reporting channels and follow-up mechanisms
Consequences of non-compliance
Communication on the commitment towards S and BP
Existing training
Actions/intruments to encourage business partners to implement commitments
Existence of communication/reporting channels and follow-up mechanisms
Consequences of non-compliance
Management review and monitoring
Practices on dealing with incidents
Public legal cases 
External review of programs
Existing control system
Training
Incentive System
Other instruments used for compliance (amnesty requests, surveys, etc.)
Consequences of non-compliance
Intruments to encourage business partners to implement commitments
Consequences of non-compliance
Corporate structure
Communication - questions, inquirires
Communication - reported incidents
Compliance cases
Other compliance KPI's (surveys, internal control related, etc.)
TOTAL SCORE 33
MONITORING
KEY 
PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS
IMPLEMENTATION
RISK 
MANAGEMENT
Employee related
Structure, inputs and outputs
Suppliers and Business Partners
Employees
Internal organization
Suppliers and Business Partners
3
13
5
11
Risk Management Activities
Monitoring Activities
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2.3.4. Reliability and validity of analysis 
 Reliability may be achieved by ensuring stability, reproducibility and accuracy 
of data (Milne and Adler, 1998). Stability means ensuring intra-observer reliability, the 
degree to which the same coder analyses the same data set over time. According to 
(Milne and Adler, 1998), a learning cycle of 20 reports need to be carried out before 
more elaborated sub-category analysis could be reliably performed on the coded output 
of less experienced coders. To ensure reliability we analyzed the 12 reports (2000-2011) 
three times, to a total of 36 reports. To guarantee reproducibility (inter-coder agreement) 
and validity of analysis the reports were examined and categorized by another 
researcher. Discrepancies in coding were analyzed and differences solved. Regarding 
accuracy - accessing coder performance - we followed Guthrie and Mathews (1985), 
and based our methods in prior research. Additionally, the disclosure index was built 
against previous studies from well-recognized organizations. 
2.4. Analysis and Results 
2.4.1. Impact of events on disclosure extensiveness 
PRE-EVENT PERIOD  - Periods 1 and 2 – 2000 to 2005 
As shown in Figure 2.1 the content analysis of the company’s annual and 
sustainability reports indicates that the lowest amount of disclosures was recorded in the 
2000-2003 pre-event period.  Results also suggest that the issuance of the UNGC’s 10th 
principle on anticorruption had only a marginal effect on disclosure.  According to 
legitimacy theory, we would have expected an increase in the volume of disclosure 
under the assumption that the company could make use of this event to gain legitimacy.  
Contrary to our expectations, however, we only note a slight increase of disclosure in 
the annual report with regards general compliance and no increase in disclosure 
specifically on corruption that year and the following.  Interestingly, and in contrast to 
all periods within the scope of our analysis, the company did not have its stand-alone 
sustainability report available online in 2004.  This finding in itself could provide 
evidence of another disclosure strategy—base level disclosure (Cho, 2009). 
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Figure 2.1. Disclosure volume on compliance and corruption, 2000-2011 
 
EVENT PERIOD - Period 3 – 2006 to 2008 
As expected, results document a significant change in Siemens’ disclosure 
patterns in 2006 as shown in Figure 1.  The volume of compliance and corruption 
disclosure included in both annual and sustainability reports exhibits a highly significant 
increase with the advent of the 2006 corruption scandal.  These results are consistent 
with the company implementing a strategy to repair its legitimacy in the wake of the 
worldwide corruption scandal.  Our findings are consistent with past studies showing a 
significant increase in disclosure after the occurrence of a legitimacy-threatening 
incident (Branco et al., 2008; Cho, 2009; Islam and Mathews, 2009; Eweje and Wu, 
2010; Coetzee and van Staden, 2011; Patriotta et al., 2011).  Results also indicate that 
the increase in disclosure volume was even more significant for the years subsequent to 
the scandal  (i.e., 2007 and 2008)—this is consistent with Deegan and Rankin (1996), 
who report a significant increase in positive disclosure after the successful trial of 20 
companies prosecuted by the New South Wales and Victorian Environmental Protection 
Industries, and Deegan et al. (2000), who show a higher increase in disclosure in the 
year following specific environmental incidents concerning a small sample of 
Australian firms.  Similar to studies such as Cho (2009), our investigation analyzes both 
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annual and sustainability reports and we note different trends across these media.  These 
include:  
 annual report disclosures for the year of the corruption scandal (i.e., 2006) are 
far more extensive than those included in the stand-alone sustainability report; 
 peaks and general increases in disclosure extensiveness occurred at different 
moments in  annual reports and sustainability reports. More concretely, peaks 
and increases in disclosure volume in sustainability reports exhibit a one-year 
lag when compared to annual reports; 
 peaks in disclosure extensiveness during the 3-year time period occurred for the 
annual report in 2007 which is the year when the company had its first 
condemnation and for the sustainability report in 2008 when the 2006 corruption 
case ended following the first settlement. 
These results thus suggest that from 2006 to 2008 Siemens disclosed 
information earlier in its annual report compared to its sustainability report.  
Furthermore, peaks in disclosure extensiveness in the 2007 annual report, but not in the 
2008 sustainability report, indicate that the company was more concerned in disclosing 
information about the first confirmation of guilt in its annual report while it would 
provide information about the process and termination of the corruption scandal case in 
its sustainability report.  The lagging results for the sustainability report may indicate a 
more reactive strategy while a more proactive disclosure strategy may have been used 
for the annual report. The immensity of the final and its impact in the annual financial 
statements may also explain why the results peaked first in the company annual report. 
Our results contrast with the findings of Frost et al. (2005) who performed a (non-
academic) study on CSD trends in Australian firms and concluded that issues related 
both to non-compliance and specifically to corruption and bribery had a higher presence 
in sustainability reports than they were in annual reports. Depending on the year, annual 
reports had more compliance and corruption disclosures than the sustainability report. 
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POST EVENT PERIOD - Period 4 – 2009-2011 
Prior studies show evidence of significant decreases in disclosure in post-event 
periods (e.g. Cho, 2009). According to De Villiers and van Staden (2006), reductions in 
disclosure may occur for instance when societal suspicions or concerns reduce or 
disappear; when the strategy turns from (re)gaining to maintaining legitimacy; when it 
is perceived that reducing disclosure will reduce the importance of the issue; when 
disclosure is perceived as useless (O'Dwyer, 2003); or when managers perceive a theme 
to be sensitive (Solomon and Lewis, 2002). 
Figure 2.1 shows an inconsistent evolution of disclosure in the post-event period 
(2009-2011).  As expected, the extensiveness of sustainability report disclosure on 
compliance decreased significantly in the year following the 2008 settlement. On the 
contrary, and against our expectations, there is again an increase in the extensiveness of 
corruption related disclosure after 2009. While we acknowledge that the 2006 likely 
raised other corruption-related concerns from 2009 to 2011, we conjecture that increases 
in disclosure are associated with possible new corruption-related situations, especially 
in 2011 when specific corruption-related disclosure substantially increased. We conduct 
further analyses below to explore the potential influence of the media. 
COMPARISON BETWEEN BEFORE AND AFTER 2006, THE YEAR OF THE 
FIRST CORRUPTION SCANDAL 
 Consistent with prior studies such as Islam and Mathews (2009) we used non-
parametric tests to whether differences in  the mean volume of disclosures between 
Periods 1 and 2 and Periods 3 and 4 exhibit statistical significance. The periods before 
and after the UN 10
th
 principle were not analyzed due to its marginal impact on 
disclosures. As presented in Table 2.2, the difference in the number of sentences on 
compliance in the sustainability report (p < .05), the number of sentences on corruption 
in the sustainability report (p < .05), the number of sentences on compliance in the 
annual report (p < .05), and the number of sentences on corruption in the annual report 
(p < .05), all differ significantly across the two periods. 
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Table 2.2. Comparison of the mean volume of disclosure between before and after 2006, 
the year of the first corruption scandal 
 
2.4.2. Impact of events on disclosure breadth 
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide details on the evolution of Siemens’ disclosure 
breadth over time. 
Figure 2.2 documents a relatively low level of disclosure breadth in both the 
annual and sustainability report concerning compliance and the absence of disclosure 
with regards to corruption in the year of the scandal.  However, we observe significant 
increases in disclosure breadth subsequent to the 2006 corruption scandal.  While the 
issuance of the UNGC 10
th
 principle does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
breadth of disclosure items, we report a significant increase in both reports the years 
following the corruption scandal.  The breadth of corruption and compliance disclosure 
increased after 2006, achieved its peak in 2008 during the year of the final settlement, 
and decreased thereafter with the exceptions of compliance disclosure, which actually 
increased in the 2009 annual report and corruption disclosure which also increased in 
the 2010 SR. 
  
Type of disclosure
Mean volume of disclosure (six-
year average) before corruption 
scandal (Periods 1 and 2)*
Mean volume of disclosure (six-
year average) during and after 
corruption scandal (Periods 3 
and 4) Z  Stat.
p-value 
(one-tailed)
Nr. of Sentences on Compliance SR 7.000000* 114.833333 -2.2874 0.0111
Nr. of Sentences on Corruption SR 1.200000* 52.166667 -1.9392 0.0262
Nr. of Sentences on Compliance AR 4.166667 87.833333 -2.8220 0.0024
Nr. of Sentences on Corruption AR 0.000000 92.166667 -2.9912 0.0014
*For the items indicated above, they represent 5-year averages due to the lack of a 2004 SR
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Figure 2.2. Disclosure breadth on compliance and corruption in SR and AR, 2000-2011 
 
Table 2.3 shows detailed evidence on the different scores per category included 
in the disclosure indexes on compliance and corruption. For most categories the peak of 
disclosure occurred in 2007 and 2008 regarding both compliance and corruption. The 
peaks in disclosure shown in pictures 2.1, 2.2 and in table 2.3 are an evidence that 
Siemens used AC disclosures to repair its legitimacy after the 2006 corruption scandal 
and the years of settlement of the 2007 and 2008 fines. 
Table 2.3. Disclosure variety on compliance and corruption in SR and AR 
 
Legend: squared cells represent peaks in disclosure and shadowed cells represent the first year of 
disclosure 
* UNGC 10th principle + First fine
** Corruption scandal ++ Final settlement
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006** 2007+ 2008++ 2009 2010 2011
D
is
c
lo
s
u
r
e
 B
r
e
a
d
th
Year
Compliance Index SR
Corruption Index SR
Compliance Index AR
Corruption Index AR
Period 1                              Period 2                   Period 3                              Period 4
INDEX Categories/Year
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Commitment and Policy 1 0 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 - 0 0 1 1 1 1 1- -
Risk Exposure 3 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 2 0 1 0
Implementation 13 0 2 3 4 - 2 2 12 12 11 11 10 0 2 0 0 - 0 0 7 10 4 6 6
Monitoring 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 5 2 2 2
KPI's 11 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 5 10 6 4 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 2 0 2 0-
Total Index SR 33 0 3 4 5 - 2 3 26 31 25 23 23 0 2 0 1 - 0 0 16 20 7 12 9
Commitment and Policy 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Risk Exposure 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 2
Implementation 13 0 0 5 0 5 6 9 10 11 13 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 5 3 3
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It is relevant to note that the company started disclaiming its commitment and 
existing policies to compliance many years before the 2006 corruption scandal and even 
before the issuance of the UNGC 10
th
 principle on the fight against. Table 2.3 results 
show that it is only after the corruption scandal that the company openly disclosed its 
clear and specific commitment to the fight against corruption to its constituents.  It also 
started to provide a broader range of information with regards to its internal formal 
structure; its exact practices of engaging employees and suppliers in implementing 
compliance rules with techniques such as training or incentive schemes; and its 
compliance monitoring activities and key performance indicators (see Appendix 4.1 for 
more details). The variety of instruments used to fight corruption followed the same 
pattern as the volume of disclosure—it increases in 2007, achieves its peak in 2008 and 
decreases thereafter. Following the scandal, the company created watchdogs and 
monitors in the figure of an “Ask Us” and “Tell Us” helpdesk for reporting incidents, 
changed the procedures of approval for business consultant agreements with some items 
fading out or disappearing in the following years as it is the case with the “Approve it” 
and “Improve it” functions which were disclosed only in 2008s (Table 2.4). We believe 
this could be an evidence of an attempt to engage in mere ceremonial conformity 
(Pfeffer, 1981). 
 
Table 2.4. Anti-corruption instruments 
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Our results are aligned with Lindbloom (1994) and Gray et al. (1995) who claim 
that one possible reaction from an organization when faced with a legitimacy 
threatening event is to invest in changing itself and educating and informing the relevant 
publics about the actual changes in actual behavior in order to meet its constituents’ 
expectations. As Suchman (1995) notes, although being a sign of change and instability, 
this type of strategy may at the same time be effective in containing the damage.  
Assuming that the company did implement the additional measures that it reports, and 
not only talked about it, that would be an evidence of substantive legitimacy repairing 
strategy. 
CHANGE IN COMPANY DISCOURSE OVER TIME 
According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy repairing strategies may at first 
consist in constructing a wall that allows the audience to separate past events from 
ongoing activities. We found evidence in Siemens discourse suggesting that it was 
engaging in such symbolic legitimacy techniques following the 2006 scandal. The 
company admitted the occurrence of the event while at the same time detaching itself 
from the problem by attributing the guilt to employees and showing its commitment to 
solving the problem, as we can see in this extract of Siemens’ 2006 annual report: 
“Unfortunately, it has now become clear that our compliance measures are not 
yet sufficient. Several former and current Company employees are under 
investigation regarding allegations of embezzlement, bribery and tax evasion. 
Siemens is doing everything in its power to facilitate the full and speedy 
clarification of this matter and has taken appropriate and immediate 
countermeasures. In this connection, we’ve also engaged independent experts to 
detect any concrete violations, identify flaws in Siemens regulatory system, 
structures and processes and eliminate these shortcomings entirely without 
exception (p. 12)”. 
 Showing remorse about unacceptable behavior is a symbolic legitimacy 
management strategy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). As 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 181) refer, apologies may serve: (1) to convey 
managements understanding and concern regarding the event, (2) garner sympathy 
from constituents, (3) reaffirm at least the appearance of managerial control and, 
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implicitly, that management has learned from the event and (4) maintain some 
managerial credibility. 
 In the 2007 corporate responsibility report the company already assumes 
responsibility although not yet admitting guilt: 
“The fact that our Company made mistakes here in the past is a painful 
realization. We’ve taken many steps to uncover misconduct and to heighten 
all employees’ awareness for lawful, ethically irreproachable behavior 
(p.3).” 
 Up to the end of 2008 the Company was convicted to pay a fine of € 1 billion. In 
that year there was a clear admission of guilt as is visible in the 2008 sustainability 
report: 
“Our three basic values are nothing new. Problems in the past arose simply 
because these values were not applied systematically. And this means they were 
not promulgated or internalized to a sufficient degree. In addition, a framework 
capable of anchoring these values was often lacking… A good reputation is a 
company’s greatest capital. In the past we endangered this reputation, as we 
did not succeed in anchoring compliance throughout the company as an 
integral part of our corporate responsibility. Compliance was not sufficiently 
integrated in our business practices, contrary to the existing internal 
regulations (p. 48, 60).” 
We also found evidence of Siemens identifying with reputed institutions and 
showing commitment towards stakeholders needs and goals which are also example of 
symbolic legitimacy management (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Suchman, 1995). After 2006, Siemens disclosed the creation of a number of new 
compliance and anticorruption programs and adherence to relevant initiatives
3
, as we 
can see from this extract of Siemens’ 2008 sustainability report:   
                                                 
3
 Such programs and initiatives included a compliance committee; a mandate for a new Chief of 
Compliance Officer; a new managing board position for legal and compliance matters; a reinforcement of 
supplier and business partner audit, qualification, risk identification and measurement procedures; 
supplier conferences with an emphasis on compliance and the Siemens Compliance Program; the Code of 
Conduct for Business Suppliers; intensive training for employees both on general compliance and 
specifically on corruption to incentive related schemes; watchdogs and monitors in the form of an 
ombudsman; a “Tell Us” helpdesk for reporting incidents; and the Siemens Integrity Initiative. 
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“Our policy of collective action includes participating in initiatives and 
organizations for combating corruption. One example is our involvement in a 
World Bank Institute collective action working group. We are also an active 
member of the working group for the tenth principle (anti-corruption) of the 
UN Global Compact and of the Commission on Anti-Corruption of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). A pilot process is currently 
underway to implement the results (p. 68).” 
Since 2006 the company disclosed its increasing participation in anticorruption 
initiatives throughout the world and its membership in additional anticorruption 
institutions and movements such as the UNGC or Transparency International (before 
2006), the World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (since 
2007), the Commission on Anti-Corruption of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(since 2008), the Anti-Corruption and Compliance Declaration (since 2009), the 
Coalition for Transparent Business in the Czech Republic, and the United Nations Anti-
Corruption Convention.  Siemens also reported an increased effort to dialogue with its 
stakeholders (e.g., the Siemens Materiality Portfolio included in its annual report since 
2007). 
 Besides the symbolic strategies, and consistent with Suchman (1995), after a 
first phase of detachment to the problem the company went a step forward and offered 
more than normalizing accounts. The company made progress in showing it was taking 
all the necessary measures to remedy the problem, as seen in the following excerpt from 
the 2008 sustainability report: 
“Compliance violations must not occur at Siemens again. For this reason we 
will continue to develop our Compliance Program along its present lines. The 
simplification and further integration of our compliance processes will be a 
main focus of our work. As part of our Collective Action Initiative, we intend to 
cooperate with other stakeholders in driving our activities to combat corruption 
(p. 148).” 
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Changes in discourse are again visible in 2009, the year after the settlement. 
Once again the Company did not ignore the issue, instead made a reference to it but 
presented it part of a past situation, which offered as an opportunity for improvement. In 
the 2009 annual report the CEO conveys this positive message to its stakeholders: 
“We’re relieved that the German and U.S. authorities investigating the 
allegations of bribery against Siemens have concluded their proceedings, and 
we’re proud that the Company is now an international benchmark in the area 
of compliance. For us, these developments are both a confirmation of our 
efforts and an incentive to remain vigilant, professional and highly focused in 
all our activities (p. 13).” 
Overall, the analysis of Siemens’ annual and sustainability reports in the years 
following the 2006 corruption scandal reveal a mixed strategy—symbolic strategies 
such as admitting guilt, associating with symbols and institutions, and performing 
ceremonial conformity; and, substantive strategies such as make actual changes in its 
methods of operations, tracking outputs in the form of key performance indicators, and 
altering resource dependencies.  
2.4.3. Effect of public pressure on disclosure volume 
Several past studies suggest that increased media attention, a potential proxy for 
social and political pressure, leads companies to increase disclosure in their annual 
reports (Bansal, 2005; Cormier et al., 2005).  In a recent study, Elijido-Ten (2011) 
concluded that the influence of media coverage on annual report disclosure, particularly 
related to environmental issues, is higher for negative and “unobtrusive” events.  We 
believe that this is also the case for compliance and corruption.  For the Siemens case, 
our results (shown in Figure 2.3 and 2.4) indicate that disclosure on corruption and 
compliance in sustainability reports follows the evolution of our proxy for public 
attention, which is in line with media agenda setting theory and previous literature 
suggesting that increased media attention leads to increased disclosure. In contrast to 
annual reports, peaks in sustainability report disclosures were systematically found to be 
one year after the peaks in media attention. This reinforces one of our previous findings 
that annual report disclosures seem to be more responsive than sustainability report 
disclosures.  A possible explanation is that Siemens anticipated different informational 
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needs from the stakeholders targeted by each type of report. For instance, annual report 
readers could be more demanding and sensitive to this type of event given that 
corruption scandals can have some material impacts on the company’s financial 
statements and possible impacts on their own wealth.  The company may disclose 
information in a more responsive manner while facing media pressure as it could 
consider the annual report audience better informed, hence feel “pressure” from this 
stakeholder group at an earlier stage and not so much as a consequence of higher media 
influence. 
Figure 2.3. Media attention and corruption disclosure volume in SR and AR 
 
Figure 2.4. Media attention and compliance disclosure volume in SR and AR 
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When comparing the number of corporate issued press releases dedicated to the 
issues of compliance and corruption with media attention dedicated to the theme of 
“Siemens corruption”, we find evidence that corporate press releases and media 
attention follow similar trends. When media attention increases the number of corporate 
press releases generally increases as well. After 2007 both corporate press releases 
decrease as well as media attention. Details are provided in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. Media attention and corporate press releases on compliance and corruption 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Media Attention  22 29 215 812 533 217 125 116 
Press releases related to 
Compliance 
0 0 1 17 7 6 5 1 
Press releases related to 
Corruption  
0 0 1 9 6 5 2 1 
Note: There are no press releases online before the corruption related event; squared 
cells represent peaks of disclosure 
 
2.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Patten, 1992; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Cho, 2009; Islam and Mathews, 2009; Eweje and Wu, 2010), our findings suggest that 
Siemens AG engaged in legitimacy repairing strategies by increasing disclosure when 
faced with an event threatening its legitimacy—the occurrence of the 2006 corruption 
scandal.  We find no evidence concerning legitimacy gaining strategies associated with 
the issuance of the UNCG 10
th
 principle on anticorruption.  The results of this study are 
aligned with past evidence since post-event disclosure clearly outcasts pre-event 
disclosures (De Villiers and van Staden, 2006; Cho, 2009).  
In addition, we find evidence supporting slight differences in disclosure 
strategies between the two main sources of content analysis—the annual report and 
stand-alone sustainability report.  Concerning the latter, findings are consistent with 
previous studies in that the peaks of disclosure breadth and extensiveness occur in the 
year following the event (e.g. Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000).  
Moreover, changes in disclosure on compliance and corruption appear to follow the 
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same trend as increases in media attention.  This is consistent with media agenda setting 
theory and legitimacy theory, since as a general rule a company’s disclosure changes in 
reaction to increased public pressure.  Concerning the annual report, results suggest that 
during the 2006-2008 period peaks in disclosure breadth and extensiveness occurred a 
year earlier than in the SR and before the heightened media attention.  One potential 
explanation for this difference of timing in the peaks of reporting is that the company 
may assume that annual report readers constitute a different audience than the 
sustainability readers and that the former have different and more demanding 
informational needs at least in terms of the timeliness of the reporting.  We could 
assume that sustainability reports are more targeted to general stakeholders such as the 
community, consumers, employees, and certain types of investors as opposed to annual 
reports, which are more financial and technical in nature target a better informed and 
more demanding public such as shareholders, banks, tax authorities, and financial 
analysts.  Such an assumption combined with the idea that the company may perceive 
social information as useful for investment decisions can potentially explain the 
occurrence of earlier peaks of information disclosure in the annual report when 
compared to the sustainability report. Our results contribute to previous research, which 
presented mixed findings.  For example, Milne and Chan (1999) find that CSD had little 
impact on the decisions made over investment funds while Deegan and Rankin (1997) 
conclude on the materiality of environmental disclosures for shareholder decision 
making along with individuals inside the organization but not for analysts or 
stockbrokers.  Teoh and Shiu (1990) conclude that general CSD was not relevant for 
institutional investors decision-making although it has potential to increase its relevance 
if presented in a quantified, financial form focusing on product improvement or fair 
business practices. Hence, additional research in this area appears warranted. 
Concerning the specific legitimacy repairing strategies used by the company, we 
our analyses indicates that in the presence of a corruption-related threatening event 
Siemens AG followed a mix of symbolic and substantive strategies (as suggested by 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Savage et al., 2000).  After the 
2006 scandal, the company became associated with several ethical institutions and 
created its own anticorruption global initiatives, which can be perceived as symbolic 
strategies. At the same time the company implemented new processes, codes and 
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procedures while reinforcing existing structures and creating new ones, such as 
watchdogs and monitors, strengthening its monitoring practices and implementing key 
performance indicators to evaluate its anticorruption and compliance performance 
which are more substantive in nature.  
Like all studies, ours is subject to several limitations.  First, it does not allow for 
any generalization given the unique case and context that we examine.  Second, it is 
limited to the extent that public company information is made available only online in 
the form of corporate reports and press releases. Third, to our knowledge the legislation 
did not change during the time period we tested so we assume that the changes were due 
to the event and not to legislation.  
Despite these limitations, however, this study contributes to existing research in 
several ways.  It first brings additional evidence to the scarce research body on the 
social dimension of CSD.  Results are relevant contributions to legitimacy theory and 
media agenda setting theory. Additionally, the specific results of this study document 
the strategic changes in Siemens AG’s disclosure breadth and extensiveness, when 
faced with specific threats to its legitimacy. The findings in this paper provide 
additional arguments for the need of better legislation/regulation or at least mandatory 
standards to ensure that companies disclose relevant, reliable and consistent information 
about important social issues such as corruption—a serious economic, social, political 
and moral issue (Argandoña, 2007). Therefore, we believe this study is relevant for 
several key societal stakeholders such as governments, corporate governance 
institutions, NGOs and CSR promoters such as the UNGC. 
Finally, this study uncovered several issues for further investigation. Additional 
research could be conducted concerning the impact of corruption related events in other 
companies in different contexts.  The present work also revealed the need for more 
research concerning factors influencing disclosure on corruption.  Although studies 
have considered the materiality and importance of social disclosure in the annual report 
for its users (e.g. Campbell et al., 2003), a lack of research exists concerning differences 
in informational needs of the users of CSD in both the annual and sustainability report, 
or possible differences in pressure generated by those different constituents. Finally, 
additional research could ask the question of how disclosures related to corruption differ 
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from environmental disclosures. In particular, is corruption a more socially taboo topic 
than environmental concerns, and do the trends between these corporate social 
disclosures differ in a significant way? 
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Appendix 2.1 
 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
INDEX TOTAL SCORE 0 3 4 5 - 2 3 26 31 25 23 23 0 2 0 1 ## 0 0 16 20 7 12 9
COMMITMENT AND POLICY 0 1 1 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Commitment to integrity/ compliance / fight corruption 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RISK EXPOSURE 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0
Carrying out risk assessment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Policies/rules for high-risk areas 1 1 1
Risks according to stakeholders 1 1 1 1 1 1
IMPLEMENTATION 0 2 3 4 - 2 2 12 12 11 11 10 0 2 0 0 - 0 0 7 10 4 6 6
Internal organization: 0 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 0 - 0 0 2 2 2 2 1
Corporate structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Programmes, processes, code of conduct, rules, etc. 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employees: 0 0 1 2 - 0 0 6 6 6 4 4 0 1 0 0 - 0 0 4 6 1 2 2
Communication on the commitment to all employees 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing training 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incentive related scheme 1 1 1 1
Other processes employee oriented 1 1 1 1 1
Existence of communication/reporting channels 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Suppliers and Busness Partners: 0 1 1 1 - 1 1 4 4 3 5 4 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 2 1 2 3
Communication on the commitment towards S and BP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing training 1 1 1
Actions/intruments to encourage business partners 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existence of communication/reporting channels 1 1 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1 1 1 1 1 1
MONITORING 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 5 2 2 2
Review of monitoring and improvement results 1 1 1 1 1 1
Practices concerning dealing with incidents 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Public legal cases regarding corruption/non compliance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
External review of programs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing control system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 5 10 6 4 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 2 0 2 0
Employees: 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2 1 0 0 0
Training 1 1 1 1 1
Incentive System 1 1
Other instruments used 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1 1 1 1 1
Suppliers and Busness Partners: 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Intruments to encourage business partners 1 1 1 1 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1 1 1
Structure, inputs and outputs: 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2 4 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Corporate structure 1 1
Communication - questions, inquirires 1 1 1 1 1
Communication - reported incidents 1 1 1
Compliance/corruption cases 1 1 1 1 1
Other compliance KPI's 1
Note: cells are shadowed in the first year of disclosure.
Disclosure variety on Compliance and Corruption in SIEMENS AG Sustainability Reports
COMPLIANCE CORRUPTION
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS
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Appendix 2.2 
 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
INDEX TOTAL SCORE 1 1 8 2 8 9 15 18 23 25 20 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 14 10 6 7
COMMITMENT AND POLICY 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Commitment to integrity/ compliance / fight corruption 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RISK EXPOSURE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 2
Carrying out risk assessment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Policies/rules for high-risk areas 1 1 1 1 1
Risks according to stakeholders
IMPLEMENTATION 0 0 5 0 5 6 9 10 11 13 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 5 3 3
Internal organization: 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 2
Corporate structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Programmes, processes, code of conduct, rules, etc. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employees: 0 0 2 0 2 2 4 5 6 6 5 5 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 5 5 2 2 1
Communication on the commitment to all employees 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing training 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Incentive related scheme 1 1 1
Other processes employee oriented 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existence of communication/reporting channels 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1 1 1 1 1 1
Suppliers and Busness Partners: 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 3 3 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Communication on the commitment towards S and BP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing training 1
Actions/intruments to encourage business partners 1 1 1 1 1
Existence of communication/reporting channels 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1
MONITORING 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 5 4 4 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 2 1 1
Review of monitoring and improvement results 1 1 1 1 1 1
Practices concerning dealing with incidents 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Public legal cases regarding corruption/non compliance 1 1 1 1 1 1
External review of programs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Existing control system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Employees: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Training 1 1 1 1
Incentive System
Other instruments used 1
Consequences of non-compliance 1
Suppliers and Busness Partners: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intruments to encourage business partners
Consequences of non-compliance
Structure, inputs and outputs: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corporate structure 1 1
Communication - questions, inquirires 1 1 1 1
Communication - reported incidents 1 1 1
Compliance/corruption cases 1
Other compliance KPI's 1 1
Disclosure variety on Compliance and Corruption in SIEMENS AG in  Annual Reports
COMPLIANCE
ANNUAL REPORTS
CORRUPTION
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CHAPTER 3 
3. BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 
DISCLOSURE IN LARGE MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 
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____________________________________________________________________ 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE IN 
LARGE MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the impact of board characteristics on anti-corruption disclosure 
(AC disclosure) by large multinational firms. Based on a lens of analysis that combines 
stakeholder-agency theory and resource-dependence theory, we suggest that boards 
characterized by higher levels of independence, knowledge and diversity are more 
likely to present higher levels of AC disclosure than their counterparts. Using 
Transparency International (TI) ratings of disclosures on anti-corruption efforts by large 
multinational firms and an ordinal regression analysis, our findings suggest that, at least 
to some extent, companies with more resources in terms of board characteristics provide 
higher levels of AC disclosure. These results suggest that a theoretical framework 
combining stakeholder and resource-dependence theories may help to understand 
corporate AC disclosure. 
Keywords: Board; corporate social responsibility; anti-corruption disclosure; corporate 
governance.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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3.1.  Introduction 
Corruption is a serious economic, social, political and moral blight affecting 
society as a whole and companies in particular (Argandoña, 2007). It is generally 
viewed as a social menace, a way to cheat disadvantaged populations by diverting 
resources away from critical services like education, clean water, and health care (Hills 
et al., 2009). From the corporate perspective, corruption’s detrimental effects are 
associated with increased operational costs through the company value chain, as well as 
significant legal and competitive risks (ibid.).   
Although it was for many years a neglected issue amongst corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) priorities (ibid.), the idea that corruption is a cancer that destroys 
business and society is now widely accepted and companies are expected to adhere to 
the worldwide efforts to combat corruption. Accordingly, anti-corruption efforts are 
now an integral part of almost all companies’ CSR agenda.   
Both Transparency International (2009) and the UNGC (2009) argue that the 
degree of anti-corruption disclosure (hereafter AC disclosure) can be a strong indicator 
of the quality and comprehensiveness of a company’s efforts in addressing corruption, 
an important mean to help understand what works in the fight against corruption, and a 
way to provide accountability with respect to performance on that field and to pressure 
other similar companies to adopt anti-corruption principles (Hess, 2009). Moreover, it is 
in this area of social disclosure that further developments are most needed (ibid.). 
Despite the global call for research on the subject of anti-corruption, few 
academic studies examine AC disclosure (e.g. Dissanayake et al., 2011; Healy and 
Serafeim, 2015; Islam et al., Forthcoming) and only Healy and Serafeim (2015) 
examine factors influencing AC disclosure. Further, while Healy and Serafeim (2015) 
include a few governance variables in their analysis of AC disclosure, no studies to date 
thoroughly explore the role of board characteristics with respect to differences in 
reporting on corruption related issues.  Our paper contributes to extant literature by 
analyzing the impact of board characteristics on AC disclosure. 
Incorporating insights from stakeholder agency-theory and resource dependence 
theory, we use an ordinal regression analysis to explore the relations between board 
characteristics and AC disclosure for a sample of 91 large multi-national firms [drawn 
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from TI (2012)]. Results suggest that a theoretical framework combining stakeholder-
agency and resource-dependence theories appear to provide an explanatory basis for AC 
disclosure as we document that companies that have specific board and firm 
characteristics provide higher levels of AC disclosure.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
brief background and an analysis of related literature. Section 3.3 presents the 
theoretical lens of analysis adopted and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes 
the research method. In Section 3.5 the main findings are reported. Finally, in section 
3.6, the findings are discussed and some conclusive remarks are offered.  
3.2. Background and related literature  
 Most current studies on corruption do not focus on understanding corporate 
disclosure practices, but rather relate the phenomenon of corruption to the social and 
cultural dimensions of countries (Davis and Ruhe, 2003; Jing and Graham, 2008), to 
human development and economic freedom (Sanyal and Samanta, 2004), to country 
institutional frameworks and the level of competition (Venard and Hanafi, 2008), to 
investment and growth (Mauro, 1995), to GDP and innovation (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). At the firm level, recent studies show a positive relation between corruption and 
having local partners in high-risk industries (Spencer and Gomez, 2011) or foreign 
direct investment (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). The limited studies examining corporate 
disclosure on the fight against corruption focus on companies’ practices with little 
emphasis on the factors explaining this type of social disclosure (Gordon and 
Wynhoven, 2003; Novethic, 2006; Transparency International, 2009; Transparency 
International, 2012; Dow Jones, 2015). 
 According to Adams (2002), past research relates corporate social disclosure 
(CSD) to three main types of factors: corporate characteristics (including size, leverage, 
profitability and industry), general contextual factors (such as the stakeholder context) 
and internal context (governance aspects such as chair characteristics or the existence of 
a CSR committee). Our study focuses on the internal corporate governance context, 
namely the characteristics of the board of directors, while also controlling for the effects 
of corporate characteristics and contextual factors.  
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Some authors posit that corporate governance and CSR concepts should be 
integrated as good corporate governance provides the foundations for good CSR 
(Aguilera et al. 2006). Whereas traditionally corporate governance was mostly related to 
questions such as what business is for, social issues including corruption are 
increasingly present in corporate boardrooms (Elkington, 2006). Given that disclosure 
policies emanate from the board of directors, sustainability disclosures may be a 
function of board characteristics (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012).  
There is as wealth of literature regarding corporate governance and the 
awareness that companies’ decisions related to CSR (Jamali et al., 2008) and to CSD 
(Ingley, 2008) are core board responsibilities. Notwithstanding, research on how board 
characteristics affect CSD is relatively scarce (Adams, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Mallin et al., 2013). Research on the impact of board 
characteristics on the disclosure regarding anti-corruption efforts is even more limited 
(Healy and Serafeim, 2015). To our knowledge only Healy and Serafeim (2015) have 
yet analyzed factors influencing AC disclosure. In their study, those authors included 
two variables related to board characteristics: proportion of independent board members 
and existence of a CSR Committee. Results showed that board members independence 
has a positive and statistically significant relation with AC disclosure and that CEO 
duality was not statistically significant at explaining AC disclosure. 
3.3. Theoretical framework  
We adopt a multi-theoretical approach to explain AC disclosure based on 
stakeholder-agency theory (SAT) and resource dependence theory (RDT). SAT draws 
on agency theory but incorporates insights from stakeholder theory. Unlike agency 
theory, SAT acknowledges short-medium run market inefficiencies and views the firm 
as a nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between managers and all stakeholders (Hill 
and Jones, 1992). According to SAT, a firm is viewed as a “multilateral set of 
relationships amongst stakeholders” instead of as a “bilateral relationship between 
shareholders and managers” (Prior et al., 2008, p.162). Other stakeholder groups 
besides shareholders exert influence on critical decisions by managers. There are 
stakeholders who contribute with critical resources to the firm and have the power to 
provide or withhold resources effectively, thus having some influence on the 
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management decisions. Such stakeholders “supply the firm with resources on the 
implicit (tacit) understanding that their claims on the organizations will be recognized” 
(Hill and Jones, 1992, p.140). Amongst these claims one can count shareholder claims 
for return on investment, employee claims for higher wages, consumer claims for higher 
quality and/or lower prices, supplier claims for lower prices and/or more stable ordering 
patterns. SAT focuses on the agency relationship between managers and all 
stakeholders, and highlights the importance of having that relationship monitored by 
governance structures (Hill and Jones 1992). According to SAT, the board of directors 
is not only responsible for safeguarding the interests of its company’s stakeholders 
(ibid.), but it must also ensure a balance between satisfying the interests of the different 
stakeholders and for being accountable towards them. Accordingly, we expect 
differences in board composition to relate to differences in AC disclosure. 
Beyond the arguments supported by SAT, we rely on RDT to better understand 
how specific differences in board composition might be expected to influence AC 
disclosure. RDT focuses on the effects of the environment on organizations. It assumes 
that organizations engage in exchanges and transactions of resources with other entities 
to ensure the supply of resources that are vital to its survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). As posited by RDT, boards bring important resources to the firm by providing 
expertise, advice and counsel (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), channels for communicating 
information with external organizations, and preferential access to commitments or 
support from outside members (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Members with experience 
and a wide range of networks add value and enhance the advisory function, while 
enhancing legitimacy and contributing to firm reputation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Mallin et al. (2013) contend that the advisory role of the board is also a measure of 
stakeholder orientation in the sense that board member resources will be used to 
implement stakeholder-oriented strategies.  
 Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) argue that the strength of the board of directors is 
strictly connected to independence and diversity, while Amran et al. (2014) assert that 
specific knowledge is also beneficial. Accordingly, we focus on these factors. We 
investigate the impact on  of five board characteristics found to influence CSD in 
previous literature: two measuring independence (CEO duality and proportion of 
independent board members); two measuring diversity (proportion of community 
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influentials and proportion of women on the board); and one measuring the impact of 
specialized social-related knowledge which we consider to be an important intangible 
regarding the specific type of social disclosure (existence of a CSR committee).  
Independence.  
CEO Duality. This variable is relevant because corporate disclosure policies are 
influenced by corporate politics and by CEOs’ attitudes (Gibbins et al., 1990). The CEO 
duality discussion identifies a possible conflict regarding the accumulation of the CEO 
and Chairman functions. The CEO is a representative of the top management and the 
chairman is a guarantee that the management is performing according to shareholders’ 
interests (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Combining the function of CEO and Chairman 
would, under an AT perspective, increase the risk that the CEO would adopt strategies 
that favor personal interests even if they are detrimental to the company (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The separation between the duties of CEO and Chairman of the board 
allegedly contributes to preventing the pursuit of personal rather than company interests 
(ibid.). Increased separation of duties could reduce the advantages associated with 
withholding information, increasing the monitoring effectiveness of the board and 
consequently ensuring higher levels of transparency, thus increasing the levels of 
disclosure. Past research shows evidence of both negative (Ballou et al., 2006; Barako 
et al., 2006; Lattemann et al., 2009) and null (Ho and Shun Wong, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) impact of duality on voluntary disclosure. 
Regarding AC disclosure we hypothesize: 
H1: Firms with CEO duality will have a lower AC disclosure. 
 
Proportion of Independent Board Members. Dominance of independent board 
members is viewed by SAT proponents as a governance instrument to enhance the 
monitoring role of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), decrease managerial discretion 
and opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gibbins et al., 1990) and 
ensure higher effectiveness (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). According to RDT, 
independents are viewed as a source of additional transparency of information due to 
their independence condition (Kesner and Johnson, 1990) and breadth of expertise 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Past research is not consensual on the influence of 
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independent board members on social disclosure. Khan et al. (2013) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) provide evidence of significantly higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure by firms with a higher proportion of non-executives (that are not necessarily 
independent). On the contrary, Eng and Mak (2003) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
concluded that an increase of non-executive directors actually reduced voluntary 
disclosure in listed Singaporean and Malayan firms, while Ho and Shun Wong (2001), 
found no evidence to support that a higher number of independents led to a higher 
extent of disclosure. Regarding anti-corruption, Healy and Serafeim (2015) concluded 
for a positive significant effect of board independence over AC disclosure. We suggest 
that a higher percentage of independents on the board reduces the benefits of 
withholding information, leading to increased disclosure regarding anti-corruption 
practices: 
H2: Firms with a higher percentage of Independent Board Members have higher 
AC disclosure. 
 
Diversity.  
Diversity is often defined as the variety, traits (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009) or 
resources brought by board members, or the different set of attributes, characteristics 
and expertise brought by the individual members to the board process and decision 
making (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Diversity brings heterogeneity to the board, 
enhanced networks and ties, contributes to a greater capacity to understand and solve 
problems, and to increased reputation (Bear et al., 2010) while also legitimizing a 
company’s actions (Hillman et al., 2000). Promoting diversity in the boardroom is 
likely to impact positively on the voluntary provision of holistic information and thus 
improves stakeholder engagement (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Studies linking board 
diversity and CSR disclosure are rare (Baracko et. al, 2006; Hannifa and Cooke, 2005; 
Khan, 2010) and seem to confirm a positive relationship between diversity and CSD 
(Rao and Tilt, 2013). To our knowledge no study has yet analyzed the impact of 
diversity on AC disclosure. To analyze the impact of diversity on AC disclosure we use 
two measures: gender and the proportion of community influential board members. 
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Proportion of Community Influentials. According to Michelon and Parbonetti 
(2012), the existence of board members who are community influential individuals 
impacts sustainability. Community influential members have networks composed of 
academic experts, scientific resources, legal, investment and commercial banking 
networks (Bear et al. 2010). In addition, they have ties to government agencies, 
community groups and non-profit organizations (Hillman et al. 2000) and provide 
access to academic experts, scientific resources, legal, investment and banking networks 
(Bear et al. 2010). Networks represent increased knowledge and they are sources of 
advice, expertise, and connections that enhance the company relationship with its 
stakeholders. In general, networks “enable [a] forum for discussion, direct attention to 
new practices, and facilitate the transmission of information and normative”. Diversity 
helps the board to better understand its environment and brings increased capacity to 
understand and solve problems (Bear et al. 2010), while also legitimizing a company’s 
actions (Hillman et al. 2000). Following Hillman et al. (2000), Markarian and 
Parbonetti (2007) and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) we classify independent directors 
as being community influential when they are retired politicians, academics, or 
members of social and non-profit organizations. We expect that an increased proportion 
of community influential individuals will increase transparency and consequently 
disclosure. We state this hypothesis as: 
H3: Companies with a higher proportion of community influential members 
have higher AC disclosure. 
Gender. Research regarding board diversity mostly focuses on gender (Van der 
Walt and Ingley, 2003; Rao and Tilt, 2013). The discussion centers on whether women 
and men bring different resources to the company because of inherently different views 
of the world or approaches to problems. Some authors contend that women are on 
average less selfish and more ethically driven (Eckel and Grossman, 1998). According 
to Rao and Tilt (2013) most past literature provides evidence of a positive relationship 
between a higher women representation in the board of directors and CSR. Past studies 
suggest that female gender positively influences CSR strategy (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 
2012), reporting (Rao et al., 2012; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014), corporate reputation 
(Brammer et al., 2009) and corporate social performance (Boulouta, 2013). 
Additionally, boards with higher women representation were shown to be more 
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sensitive to CSR (Williams, 2003) and to achieve higher CSR strength ratings (Bear et 
al., 2010). Also, women directors were found to be more philanthropically driven 
compared to more economically driven male directors either globally (Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1994; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Williams, 2003) and in specific areas like 
community and the arts (Williams, 2003). Among the few exceptions to that positive 
relation are for instance the studies of Bear et al. (2010) that found no relation between 
the presence of women on the board and environmental social disclosure or Khan 
(2010) who found no significant relationship between having woman in the board and 
CSR reporting. Regarding AC disclosure, we hypothesize: 
H4: Firms with higher percentage of female board members will have a higher 
AC disclosure. 
 
Knowledge 
CSR Committee. The establishment of a CSR committee is viewed as a capital 
resource for an organization (Amran et al., 2014, p.222). The presence of a CSR 
representative on the board could bring increased knowledge and awareness on the 
importance of global CSR and more specifically about the CSR issue under study – that 
of the fight against corruption. Having a CSR representative on the board may be a 
resource used by the company to ensure institutional legitimacy and may act as a 
substitute for increased disclosure, or on the contrary act as a resource that could make 
boards more sensitive to CSR issues, consequently increasing transparency and leading 
to increased disclosure. Specific knowledge of the board has been the subject of 
research in the past through studies about diversity provided by education and the past 
track of board members. Regarding the impact of specific committees on disclosure, 
Kent and Monem (2008) found a positive relation between the existence of an 
environmental committee and triple bottom line reporting in Australia, whereas 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) only found weak evidence of the relation between the 
presence of a CSR Committee or Director on social disclosure. Following RDT, and 
regarding AC disclosure, we hypothesize that: 
H5: Firms with CSR representatives on the Board have higher AC disclosure. 
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3.4. Research design 
Our initial sample consisted of the 105 publicly listed companies included in the 
Transparency International Report “Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Accessing 
the World Largest Companies” (TI 2012). We excluded 14 companies for which we 
could not gather data regarding the independent variables
4
, resulting in a final sample of 
91 firms (Table 3.1). Country distribution reflects a comparatively high number of 
observations in the United Kingdom (13) and United States of America (39). Regarding 
industry, observations are concentrated over four main industry types, namely consumer 
goods and services (N=16), healthcare (N=10), oil and gas (N=14) and technology 
(N=10). 
 
Table 3.1. Sample by country and industry 
Country Total Country Total Industry Total 
Australia 3 Japan 4 Basic Materials 3 
Belgium 1 Korea 1 Consumer Goods & Services 16 
Brazil 1 Luxembourg 1 Healthcare 10 
Canada 2 Mexico 1 Industrials 5 
China 4 Netherlands 1 Oil & Gas 14 
France 6 Norway 1 Technology 10 
Hong Kong 1 Spain 2 Telecommunications 7 
India 2 Switzerland 3 Utilities 3 
Israel 1 UK 13   
Italy 2 USA 39   
Totals   91  91 
 
Our dependent variable is based on the Anti-Corruption Index as provided by TI 
(2012). Using documents or information publicly available on the global websites of the 
                                                 
4
 We excluded 14 companies from Germany (8), Brazil (2), China (1), Japan (1), Russia (1) and Saudi 
Arabia (1) for which we could not gather information regarding board independence or CEO duality. 
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companies included in the sample, TI (2012) developed a weighted index including 
thirteen categories (seven related to companies’ policies, five to internal practices and 
one to monitoring activities). We adapted the index provided by TI by un-weighting the 
index and attributing a score of “1” if a particular category was disclosed or “0” if no 
disclosure was detected. The final adapted AC disclosure index amounted to a 
maximum of 13 points. 
We used the ordinal logistic regression to test the relationships between the 
dependent and the independent variables. The model used is as follows: 
DUAL INDEP CI + GENDER CSR STAKE INDRISK  
UNGC  SIZE PROFIT 
Independent variables and data sources are listed in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Summary if independent variables 
Variable Definition Measure Source 
DUAL CEO Duality 1 if the CEO is Chairman, 0 if 
otherwise 
 
Annual 
Report, 
Proxy 
Statements
Website 
INDEP Proportion of Independents Ratio of independent board members to 
board size 
CI Proportion of Community 
Influentials 
Ratio of Community Influentials to 
board size 
GENDER Percentage of Women Ratio of women on board to board size 
CSR CSR Committee on the Board 1 if there is a CSR Committee member 
on the board; 0 otherwise 
STAKE Stakeholder Orientation Construct as used by Dhaliwal et al. (2012) 
INDRISK Pertaining to a Risk Industry 1 if the Company operates in a 
corruption-risk industry (as defined by 
TI), 0 otherwise 
OSIRIS 
Database 
UNGC Pertaining to UNGC 1 if UNGC Signatory, 0otherwise UNGC 
OSIRIS 
Database 
SIZE Company size Log (Total Assets of the Firm) 
PROFIT Company profitability ROE (Profit/Loss to Total Equity) 
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The main independent variables used in the model pertain to the board 
characteristics as discussed above. We also include several control variables to capture 
other factors that are likely to influence AC disclosure. First, a country’s stakeholder 
orientation is considered. The influence of the various stakeholders over managerial 
decisions, such as on AC disclosure, is likely to be greater in countries with higher 
stakeholder orientation where constituents may pressure the company towards increased 
transparency leading to increased disclosure (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005; Kolk and 
Perego, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2014). We use the Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012) country stakeholder orientation measure (STAKE), which comprises information 
regarding: (1) countries environment in protecting stakeholders regarding employment, 
social security, collective bargaining and human rights laws; (2) the existence of CSR 
related laws in each country; (3) the country level of public awareness regarding CSR 
issues; (4) countries relative rankings regarding sustainable development, ethical 
practices, social responsibility of leaders and corporate responsibility competitiveness. 
Second, we control for association with the United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC). Engaging in associations with symbols of legitimacy may be a way for a 
company to ensure legitimacy (Lindblom, 1994) and achieve enhanced reputation, and 
we argue that adherence to the UNGC might serve this purpose. Further, UNGC 
signatories have more publicly available information in terms of policy and 
management systems related to anti-corruption than other companies (TI, 2009). Hence, 
we include a one/zero indicator variable to identify companies that are UNGC 
signatories.   
Third, prior evidence suggests that companies from higher corruption risk 
sectors disclose more on their anti-corruption practices (Gordon and Wynhoven, 2003; 
Novethic, 2006; Healy and Serafeim, 2015). Following Healy and Serafeim (2015), we 
use TI (2009) classifications of differences in industry risk of corruption. Firms in the 
Oil & Gas operations, Basic Materials, Aerospace & Defence, Capital Goods, 
Construction, Telecommunication Services and Utilities are considered as being of 
higher risk of corruption. A one/zero indicator is used to account for companies 
pertaining/not pertaining to industries at a higher risk of corruption.  
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Finally, we include controls for size and profitability. Size has persistently been 
found to be a factor influencing CSD. Larger corporations are expected to have higher 
disclosure because they have a bigger effect on community and face the pressure of 
larger stakeholder groups (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Patten, 1991; Patten, 1992; Gray 
et al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996). More profitable companies are deemed to have 
increased resources available for CSD (Hackston and Milne, 1996) and also increased 
sensitivity and knowledge regarding CSR (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989), both leading to 
potentially higher levels of AC disclosure. 
3.5. Main findings 
Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables are shown in 
Table 3.3. Our independent variable, AC disclosure, has an average value of nine out of 
13, which suggests a relatively high level of disclosure by the companies in our sample. 
Regarding independence, board seats of the majority of companies are occupied by 
independents (68%) and 46% of the companies have the same person performing CEO 
and Chairman functions. In terms of diversity, on average, 51% of board members are 
community influentials and 18% are women. Slightly more than one third of our sample 
companies had CSR committees represented on the board. Approximately 29% of the 
companies analyzed are from risk industries and 47% were enlisted in the UNGC in our 
year of analysis. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum SD 
Dependent variable     
  
   Anti-Corruption Disclosure 9 0.00 13.00 3.24 
Continuous independent variables 
 
   INDEP (%) 0.68 0.00 1.00 0.24 
   CI (%) 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.25 
   GEND (%)   0.18 0.00 0.43 0.11 
   STAKE -0.49 -2.73 2.62 1.22 
   SIZE (Log Assets) 8.23 6.40 9.40 5.89 
   PROFIT (ROE %) 86.56 -8.12 5476.86 571.65 
Dichotomous independent variables  
 
Yes No  
  DUAL 
 
46% 54%  
  CSR 
 
32% 68%  
  IND_RISK 
 
29% 71%  
  UNGC 
 
47% 53%  
 
Table 3.4 provides Pearson correlations for our continuous independent variables. As 
indicated in the table, the correlation coefficients between variables is not high, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem
5
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 As a rule-of-thumb, multicollinearity in regression analysis is considered harmful only when it exceeds 
0.8 (Gujarati, 1995). 
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Table 3.4. Pearson correlation matrix for the continuous independent variables 
  INDEP CI GEND STAKE SIZE ROE 
INDEP 1      
CI 0.437** 1     
GEND 0.381** 0.273** 1    
STAKE -0.063 -0.167 0.041 1   
SIZE 0.018 0.110 0.065 0.255* 1 
 
ROE 0.055 -0.073 0.000 -0.092 -0.124 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 3.5. The explanatory 
power of the model is relatively high based on the Nagerlkerke R
2
 of 37.3%. With the 
exception of size, the coefficients of all control variables are in the hypothesized 
directions, and stakeholder orientation, industry risk, and size (although signed opposite 
from expectations) are statistically significant. The unexpected finding with regard to 
firm size is potentially a function of TI’s focus on only the very largest multinational 
firms in the world.  Importantly, we find at least some evidence that board 
characteristics, as hypothesized, appear to influence AC disclosure. The positive and 
significant association for the proportion of independents confirms our expectation that 
companies with more independent board members have increased disclosure regarding 
their anti-corruption practices (Hypothesis 2). Similarly, we find support for Hypotheses 
3 and 4 in that our diversity variables, measured by gender and the proportion of 
community influential members on the board, are both positively and significantly (at p 
< .10, or better) related to AC disclosure. However, while both the CEO duality and 
CSR variables are signed as expected, neither is statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  As such our findings do not support Hypotheses 1 or 5.   
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Table 3.5. Results from Ordinal Regression 
 Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig. 
LOCATION      
   INDEP (%)  2.745 0.005    STAKE  0.404 0.042 
   CI (%) 2.143 0.021    IND_RISK  = 0.00 -0.962 0.036 
   GEND (%)  3.473 0.087    UNGC = 0.00 -0.669 0.121 
   DUAL  -0.206 0.631    SIZE (Log Assets)  -0.909 0.011 
   CSR= 0.00   -0.364 0.401    PROFIT (ROE %)  0.000 0.356 
Model Statistics      
  X
2
 41.903    Sig. 0.000  
  Two log likelihood 381.360    Nagelkerke R
2
 0.373  
      
 
3.6. Discussion and concluding comments  
In this study, we examined the impact of board characteristics on AC disclosure. 
Using a frame of analysis combining stakeholder-agency and resource dependence 
theories, we find that certain board characteristics appear to explain differences in AC 
disclosure by the large multinational companies included in our sample.  
We document a significant positive association between overall board member 
independence and AC disclosure, suggesting that stronger boards may implement 
additional monitoring and advisory mechanisms to reduce the asymmetry of 
information between the preparers of information and stakeholders (Rhodes, 2010), 
consequently presenting higher AC disclosure. This result is also in line with past 
studies suggesting that boards with a higher proportion of outside members are more 
concerned with reputation and sustainability (Ibrahim and Angelidis 1995; Post et al. 
2011) and with Healy and Serafeim (2015), who also found a positive significant 
relation between board independence and AC disclosure. It is important to highlight, as 
Healy and Serafeim (2015) also refer, that it is difficult to evaluate whether boards with 
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increased independence actually have stronger anti-corruption efforts or they just have 
improved disclosures.  
Results also support our expectations that diversity on the board will lead to 
greater AC disclosure.  Consistent with Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), we find that 
higher levels of community influentials on the board are associated with higher 
disclosure levels. Similarly, we document that a greater representation of women on 
boards of directors is significantly associated with higher AC disclosure (although only 
at a 90% confidence interval), a finding consistent with other prior studies of board 
composition on aspects of social disclosure (e.g., Williams, 2003; Mallin et al. 2013).   
 In contrast to expectations, but aligned with Healy and Serafeim (2015), our 
results show that CEO duality is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Similarly, the presence of a CSR committee on the board was also not statistically 
significant at explaining AC disclosure. 
 In general, the findings that certain differences in board characteristics are 
associated with higher levels of AC disclosure suggest that exploring CSD practices 
through a combined lens of SAT and RDT is warranted.  Boards are argued to be 
important tools for maintaining stakeholder relations and the resources that diversity 
and expertise bring appear to help in explaining disclosure choices.  Extending this 
reasoning to examinations of other types of corporate information provision could thus 
prove interesting.  While our investigation adds to the limited body of research 
concerning the impact of corporate governance on CSD, we more importantly shed light 
on the under-researched topic of corporate anti-corruption practices. Understanding 
what motivates AC disclosure is essential because corporate disclosure of efforts to 
combat corruption can further enforce activities while opening the dialogue to other 
stakeholders who can then pressure the firm, access its efforts and distribute knowledge 
of best practices (Osuji, 2011). 
Like all studies, ours is subject to limitations. First, we focus on a relatively 
small number of multinational companies and the degree to which our findings 
generalize to broader samples is not addressed. Thus, extending our analysis to a larger 
sample that is richer in terms of size, industry, and country of origin would appear to be 
warranted. A further limitation is that our reliance on the TI disclosure ratings means 
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that we are analyzing disclosure that particular organization deems as relevant.  
Alternative disclosure schemes focusing more heavily on anti-corruption performance 
metrics could potentially also prove interesting.  Finally, we note that our study 
examines AC disclosure at one particular point in time.  Examining whether adaptations 
in board characteristics lead to changes in AC disclosure or other aspects of anti-
corruption performance would strengthen the basic findings document here.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4. MARKET REACTIONS TO TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS ON CORPORATE ANTI-
CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE 
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MARKET REACTIONS TO TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 
ON CORPORATE ANTI-CORRUPTION DISCLOSURE 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine the investor response to the issuance of Transparency 
International’s (TI) 2012 and 2014 "Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing 
the World’s Largest Companies" reports. Building on prior studies of political cost-
inducing events in the environmental domain, we anticipate a negative market reaction, 
although we argue that the adjustment will be less severe for firms rated as having 
better anti-corruption disclosure. Focusing on a sample of U.S companies to control for 
country-level effects and to allow for comparison with the prior environmental-themed 
studies, we document a significantly negative market reaction to the first TI report 
issuance.  Although also negative, the market reaction to the 2014 report was not 
statistically significant.  However, we also document that, as expected, market 
adjustments differ significantly across sub-groups based on anti-corruption disclosure in 
both time periods.  These results hold controlling for other factors potentially 
influencing investor perceptions of exposure to the report issuances.  In general, our 
results are consistent with the prior studies and suggest the market is savvy to political 
cost exposures arising from non-environmental events.  
 
Keywords: AC disclosure, Transparency International; Regulatory Costs 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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4.1. Introduction 
 Corruption has become one of today’s most pressing global and ethical 
problems (Sanyal and Samanta, 2004; Everett et al., 2006) and a major social issue 
(Ashforth et al., 2008). Studies indicate that corruption is widespread in international 
business (Hauser and Hogenacker, 2014) and has severe economic and social 
consequences. And while several organizations are well known for contributing to the 
fight against corruption, perhaps foremost among those is Transparency International 
(TI). Wang and Rosenau (2001), Andersson and Heywood (2009), and others note that 
the organization has used a series of indices and publications to bring attention to the 
issue of corruption.  Until 2012, the TI efforts focused only on country-level 
performance and information. However, in that year, the organization released its first 
firm-level report under the name “Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing the 
World’s Largest Companies” (Transparency International, 2012) and followed that up 
with a second release in 2014. In this study, we analyze the investor reaction to the 
issuance of these firm-level TI reports. 
 A number of prior studies document significant negative market reactions for 
U.S. companies following events potentially increasing political cost exposure (e.g. Hill 
and Schneeweis, 1983; Blaconniere and Patten, 1994; Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997), 
although these relate almost exclusively to issues in the environmental domain
6
. We 
extend this vein of research by focusing on a corporate social issue, corruption, that we 
argue might also induce increased exposures for affected companies.  Further, because 
the prior studies indicate that differences in political cost exposure relate to differences 
in market response across firms, we explore whether having better anti-corruption 
disclosure (hereafter AC disclosure) as evaluated by TI in their reports serves to reduce 
negative market reactions for companies included in the releases.   
 Using a sample of U.S. companies to reduce potential country-level effects and 
to allow for comparison with the prior environmental-themed studies, we find a 
negative and statistically significant average market reaction to the issuance of the 2012 
TI report.  We also document that companies rated as better AC disclosers suffered 
                                                 
6
 An exception is Dowdell et al. (1992) investigation of the market reaction to a series of deaths due to 
product tampering in the pharmaceutical industry. 
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significantly less negative reactions, although other potential regulatory cost exposure 
variables were not significant.  In contrast, while the mean market response to the 
issuance of TI’s 2014 report is not statistically significant overall, AC disclosure, 
controlling for the other regulatory cost exposures, is again positively related to market 
changes.  These results are consistent with the findings of the prior investigations into 
environmental-related events, and suggest that investors are equally as savvy to 
potential political cost exposures in other corporate social responsibility areas of 
concern.   
 Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide background on 
corruption and TI, followed by a literature review and the development of our 
hypotheses. We then present our methods and results, followed by our conclusion 
section.   
4.2. Relevant literature and development of hypotheses 
 In this study, we are interested in the on-going issue of corporate corruption.  
Hess and Ford (2008, p.312) argue, for example, that bribery remains “a common 
business practice,” and according to Wang and Rosenau (2001) companies world-wide 
pay out more than $80 billion on bribes each year.  Evidence from KPMG Forensics’ 
Integrity Survey 2013 indicates that issues with money laundering and other illicit 
activities are also widespread within the corporate world (KPMG Forensic, 2013). The 
issue of corruption has received increasing attention from both the media and academic 
investigators over the past two decades (Andersson and Heywood, 2009), although 
much of the latter tends to focus on macroeconomic aggregates such as output, 
consumption, and physical capital (Donadelli et al., 2014). Andersson and Heywood 
(2009, p.747) argue that TI has been the most influential organization in terms of 
“sharpening the focus on corruption.” 
 Established in 1993, TI employs a variety of tools in its work to curb corruption.  
For example, the organization has established alliances with worldwide institutions such 
as the Office of Economic Development and the World Bank, and it has also published 
documents such as “Business Principles for Countering Bribery” and the “Corruption 
Fight Toolkit” to offer advice and suggestions on reducing corruption practices (Wang 
and Rosenau, 2001).  Perhaps most importantly, at the country level TI has published an 
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annual “Corruption Perceptions Index” since 1995, ranking countries in terms of their 
perceived levels of corruption (Andersson and Heywood, 2009).  The intent of the 
organization, according to Wang and Rosenau (2001), is to employ what is often 
referred to as politics of shame to heighten public awareness of corruption issues.   
 Until 2012, TI issued no formal reports singling out the corruption issues 
associated with specific firms, but in July of that year released its first-ever 
“Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing the World’s Largest Companies.”  
The report, and a follow-up issued in November of 2014, rated the companies on the 
disclosure of their efforts to combat corruption.  TI argues that company reporting on 
anti-corruption efforts can allow stakeholders to better monitor firms’ activities, which 
in turn may provide incentives for companies to reduce corruption practices.  However, 
because the reports, for the first time, single out companies for their efforts with respect 
to the issue of corruption, we believe their issuance may serve to increase the likelihood 
that firms included in the reports may face greater social and political pressures with 
respect to their corruption exposures.  If investors believe this is true, it could be 
expected to lead to market valuation impacts for the companies.   
4.3. Prior studies of political cost exposure 
 A number of academic investigations explore how investors respond to events 
that potentially increase the social and political cost exposure of affected firms.  The 
earliest of these, Hill and Schneeweis (1983) and Bowen et al. (1983), both examine the 
market reaction following the near nuclear meltdown at General Public Utility’s (GPU) 
Three Mile Island power plant in 1979.  Focusing on U.S. utility companies other than 
GPU, both studies find significant negative market reactions for intra-industry firms 
with nuclear power-based facilities, with the latter study showing more negative 
reactions for firms with higher dependence on nuclear power.
7
  As the market prices for 
utilities without nuclear capacity were virtually unchanged, both sets of authors attribute 
the primary findings to investor concerns with potential regulatory cost increases 
associated with nuclear power generation.  In a somewhat similar study, Blaconniere 
and Patten (1994) investigate the intra-industry market reaction following Union 
                                                 
7
 Hill and Schneeweis (1983) use monthly returns whereas Bowen et al. (1983) rely on daily returns.  The 
studies also differ in the way they break out the nuclear power capacity of their respective samples. 
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Carbide’s chemical leak in Bhopal, India in 1984.  Also relying on a sample of only 
U.S. companies, Blacconiere and Patten document a significant negative market 
adjustment for their portfolio of firms over the five trading-day period following the 
disaster.  In cross sectional analysis, the authors also show that individual company 
market reactions were negatively associated with firms’ levels of chemical sales as a 
ratio of overall revenues, and positively related to levels of prior environmental 
disclosure.  Blacconiere and Patten thus argue that, consistent with the studies of Three 
Mile Island, it was regulatory cost exposure that drove the market reaction.  Also 
examining a catastrophic environmental event, Patten and Nance (1998) analyzed the 
market reaction of U. S. petroleum companies (other than Exxon) following the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska.  In contrast to the prior studies, Patten 
and Nance report increased market returns, on average, for this particular event.  
However, using cross sectional tests, they show that abnormal returns were negatively 
related to both firm size and having petroleum operations in Alaska, and positively 
associated with levels of prior environmental disclosure.  Patten and Nance (1998) thus 
claim regulatory cost concerns significantly influenced the market reactions even 
though the returns were positive overall. 
 Focusing on legislative environmental events as opposed to environmental 
disasters, two additional studies also present evidence that investors negatively value 
exposure to potential regulatory cost exposures.  The first of these, Blacconiere and 
Northcut (1997), determine the overall market reaction to a series of events related to 
the passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.  
Blacconiere and Northcut report negative cumulative abnormal returns, on average, for 
their sample of U.S. firms with chemical operations, and further find that reactions are 
more negative for firms with larger Superfund exposures while, consistent with 
Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Patten and Nance (1998), companies with higher 
levels of environmental disclosure suffered less negative market effects.  Finally, 
Freedman and Patten (2004) report an overall positive market reaction surrounding the 
first President Bush’s unexpected call for changes to the Clean Air Act in June of 1989, 
but also document that companies with higher levels of airborne toxic releases suffered 
more negative adjustments while differences in the reaction were positively related to 
levels of prior environmental disclosure. 
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4.4. Hypothesis development 
 In contrast to events of an environmental nature, we focus in this study on the TI 
release of reports with company-level assessments related to the issue of corruption.  As 
noted above, TI is recognized as a major force in the battle against corruption, and as 
such, we argue that investors could see the reports as increasing social and political 
exposures for affected firms.  For example, knowing that TI is evaluating, and making 
publicly available, company efforts with respect to corruption efforts could lead 
investors to believe firms will need to incur additional costs to improve those efforts, 
communicate the changes, and participate in any political debate arising from TI’s 
efforts.  Based on the results of the prior environmental-related studies, we would 
therefore anticipate a negative market response to the issuance of the TI reports, and we 
formally state this hypothesis as: 
 H1: The market reaction to the issuance of TI firm-level reports will be negative.  
 
 While, on average, we anticipate negative market responses to the issuance of 
the TI reports, prior research also suggests that the reaction will vary across social and 
political cost exposure.  A primary focus of the TI firm-level reports relates to the 
information companies are already providing regarding their effort to address corporate 
corruption.  As such, we believe that investors will assess less exposure risk to firms 
rated as having better AC disclosure by TI, and will thus anticipate lower levels of cost 
exposure for these firms.  We state this second hypothesis as:  
 H2: Companies with better AC disclosure will suffer less negative market 
reactions to the issuance of TI firm level reports. 
 
4.5. Methods 
4.5.1. Sample 
 We draw our sample from the 2012 and 2014 Transparency International reports 
on corporate transparency and anti-corruption reporting.  However, in order to control 
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for potential differences in regional perceptions toward corporate corruption
8
 and to 
allow for comparison with prior research into the market reaction to potential regulatory 
cost increases, we limit our analysis to only the U.S.-based firms included in the reports.  
We also used the LexisNexis database to search for potentially confounding events 
surrounding the dates of the TI report releases for each of the U.S. companies included 
in the reports to assure that any market adjustments were not a function of other news. 
Our final sample consists of 39 companies in 2012 and 43 firms from 2014.  As TI 
focused only on the largest multi-national firms in the world for its ratings, our sample 
companies are large (e.g., average market value of $123 billion in 2012), and they 
represent seven (eight) different industry sectors in 2012 (2014).  Appendix 4.1 
identifies the sample firms for each of the two periods of our analysis. 
4.5.2. Market Reaction 
Following Brown and Warner (1985) and others, we use standard event study 
methods to determine the investor response to the TI report releases. Under this 
approach, we first identify the sensitivity of each firm’s stock movements to changes in 
the overall market by estimating the standard market model
9
 stated as:     
 
where t is the time index, i is the security,  is the error term associated with security i 
at the moment t,  is the market return of security i in day t,  is the return of the 
market portfolio (measured in our study by the S&P 500) and  are the parameters of 
the market model.  We collect daily stock return data from DATASTREAM, and we 
estimate the model over a 200 trading day period culminating two days before the 
release date of each of the reports (10 July 2012 and 4 November 2014).  
                                                 
8
 Regional perceptions regarding corruption may differ across countries. The U.S. has had a particularly 
strong intervention in the fight against corruption. Since the approval of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act in 1977 several measures have been taken regarding the fight against corruption. The U.S. has played 
an important role in the fight against international corruption through leading and/or participating in 
initiatives such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention (through the International Anti-bribery Act) both in 1997, the United Nations Convention 
against corruption and the adoption of the National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts Against 
Kleptocracy in 2004 or the Dodd-Frank Act in 2008. More recent developments include the approval of 
the first Anti-Corruption Act in Florida State in 2014. (www.ussoecd.usmission.gov;  www.transparency-
usa.org)   
9
 Market model methods have been extensively used to estimate abnormal returns (Dowdell et al., 1992; 
Blaconniere and Patten, 1994; Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Patten and Nance, 1998). 
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 For each day of the test period, we calculate the abnormal return as a company’s 
actual return minus the expected return based on the parameter estimates from the 
market model regressions and overall market returns for the date: 
 
and then identify cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by summing abnormal returns 
over the four-day period from trading dates -1 through +2.  We use these returns to test 
our first hypothesis. 
4.5.3. Impact of anti-corruption disclosure 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we first partition the sample for each issuance at the mean 
AC score for the period and use a standard t-test of means to identify the significance of 
the differences. We expect the average market reactions to be less negative for 
companies in the better reporting classification for each of the test periods. However, 
because other factors might be expected to also impact investor perceptions of the 
regulatory cost risk arising from the TI report releases, we also estimate the following 
model to control for these potential effects: 
 
where, 
= cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the event window t 
= scores 1 if AC score of firm i is above average for period t, and 0 otherwise  
= scores 1 if firm i is from a high corruption risk industry, and 0 otherwise  
= the natural log of firm i’s total assets for period t  
= scores 1 if firm i had any corruption-related news articles for period t, 
  and 0 otherwise. 
 Our primary test variable, “AC Code”, is again based on the AC disclosure 
scores assigned by TI, and we classify firms with scores above the mean for the sample 
in each period as 1, and zero otherwise.  We expect this variable to be positively related 
to the CARs.   
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  We include our first control variable, industry risk (“IndRisk”), to designate 
companies operating in sectors argued to be at more risk for corruption.  Healy and 
Serafeim (2015), for example, claim that companies in industries having more 
interactions with governments relative to the sale of goods or services likely face greater 
corruption risks.  Both Donadelli et al. (2014) and Donadelli and Persha (2014) 
document a more negative relation between corruption and performance for firms in 
corruption sensitive industries. If investors believe the release of the TI reports would 
increase exposure for companies with greater corruption risk, we would anticipate more 
negative market reactions for these firms.  We rely on TI’s 2009 “Bribe Payers Index” 
to identify corruption risks across industries, and based on that report, we classify firms 
in the Oil & Gas Operations, Basic Materials, Aerospace & Defense, Capital Goods, 
Construction, Telecommunication services, and Utilities industries as being of higher 
risk.  We use a one/zero indicator variable to designate the high risk firms.   
 Our second control variable, firm size, has been used extensively in corporate 
disclosure research as a proxy for political costs, but its expected relation to the market 
reaction in this case is not clear cut.  If investors anticipate larger companies to be more 
visible and, as such, more exposed to potential regulatory costs (e.g. Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Blaconniere and Patten, 1994; 
Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997), we would anticipate firm size to be negatively related 
to the CARs surrounding the issuance of the TI reports. Alternatively, however, 
investors could believe that larger firms have more resources at their disposal to fight 
corruption and/or have better anti-corruption practices already in place.  If so, investors 
might see these companies as being less exposed to the potential regulatory costs, 
leading to a more positive market adjustment.  We measure “Size” as the natural 
logarithm of assets
10
 for each sample firm in the year of the respective report release, 
and we make no predictions as to the direction of the relation. 
 Finally, we also include a control for the media exposure our sample companies 
faced with respect to corruption issues in the year prior to the release of each of the TI 
reports.  A number of CSR-related studies (e.g. Brown and Deegan, 1998; Patten, 
2002a; Aerts and Cormier, 2009) argue that media coverage appears to lead to greater 
                                                 
10
 As a sensitivity test, we also estimate our model using the log of firm sales.  Results, not presented 
here, are qualitatively similar to those using the assets measure. 
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social and political exposure, and as such, we anticipate that investors will react more 
negatively to the TI report issuance for companies facing such exposure.  Again using 
the LexisNexis database, we searched for articles related to corruption, bribery, money 
laundering, whistle blowing, and scandal for each of the sample companies for the one 
year period prior to each of the TI report release dates.
11
  We code our control variable 
(“MediaExp”) one for any company with a corruption-related article in the media in the 
year prior to the relevant report, and zero otherwise.   
4.6. Results 
 Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on the primary variables used in our 
analysis. Average AC disclosure scores were quite similar across the two periods (74.17 
in 2012 and 74.00 in 2014) and ranged from 27 to 92 in 2012 and 35 to 96 in 2014.  
Descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 also show that 17.9% and 18.6% of our sample 
companies operated in high corruption risk industries in 2012 and 2014, respectively. 
Regarding media exposure, 35.9% of the 2012 sample companies and 34.5% of the 
2014 sample companies had at least one corruption related news article published about 
them in the year previous to the TI report release. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
AC Disclosure Score 2012 39 27 92 74.17 13.911 
AC Disclosure Score 2014 43 35 96 74.00 14.599 
Log Assets 2012 39 7.52 9.38 8.14 0.4986 
Log Assets 2014 43 7.40 9.36 8.09 0.5132 
Sample Frequencies  2012  2014  
Industry Risk 
 
7  8  
(17.9%)  (18.6%)  
Media exposure 14  15  
 (35.9%)  (34.5%)  
 
                                                 
11
 Following Gilley et al. (2000), our search was performed over the following media sources: The Wall 
Street Journal, USA Today, The Washington Post and Financial Times. 
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 Table 4.2 identifies the mean market reactions for our sample companies across 
the two event periods.  As highlighted in the table, the mean CAR for the 2012 report 
release was -1.01 percent, and this is statistically significant at p = .009, one-tailed.  
Although also negative (-0.46 percent), the average market response to the release of the 
2014 report is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Further, a review of 
individual company CARs revealed one observation that fell more than three standard 
deviations from the mean.  Excluding this outlier observation (a CAR of – 10.83 
percent), average abnormal returns were reduced to -0.22 percent, which again, is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels
12
. Overall, these results indicate that only 
the initial report release led to significant downward adjustments, on average, to sample 
company market value.  
Table 4.2. Mean CARs 
Year of Report Mean Car t-statistic Significance 
2012 -1.01% -2.743 0.009 
2014 – overall 
2014 – no outlier 
-0.46% 
-0.22% 
-1.234 
-0.747 
0.224 
0.460 
 
 
 Results for tests for differences in the mean reactions across better and worse 
AC disclosers, presented in Table 4.3, indicate that in both periods, companies with 
better AC disclosure suffered less negative mean market reactions than firms with lower 
disclosure ratings.  Our independent test of means, summarized in Panel A of the table, 
shows that the difference in CARs in 2012 is statistically significant (p = .019, one-
tailed) based on a mean market reaction of -1.88% for the worse disclosers in 
comparison to an average CAR of only -0.04% for the firms with better disclosure 
ratings. For 2014, the companies rated as worse disclosers reflected a mean CAR of -
0.67%, whereas the better disclosers’ average decline was only 0.30%.  As noted in 
Panel B of Table 3 this difference in returns is not statistically significant.  However, 
when the outlier observation is removed, the mean CAR for the better disclosing 
                                                 
12
 Mean CARs over a slightly shorter three day (-1,1) time frame were -0.67% in 2012, -0.22% in 2014 
considering the entire sample and - 0.27% in 2014 when excluding the outlier observation.  
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companies improves to a positive 0.16 percent, and is significantly different from the 
average for the worse disclosure group, although only at p = .083, one-tailed (see Panel 
C of Table 4.3).     
Table 4.3. Differences in mean CARs across AC disclosure 
Panel A – 2012     
Category N Mean CAR t-statistic Significance
a
 
Better AC Disclosers
b
 23 -0.04%   
Worse AC Disclosers 16 -1.88% 2.165 .019 
Panel B – 2014 – Overall     
Category     
Better AC Disclosers
b
 24 -0.30%   
Worse AC Disclosers 19 -0.67% 0.507 .308 
Panel B – 2014 – No Outlier     
Category     
Better AC Disclosers
b
 23  0.16%   
Worse AC Disclosers 19 -0.67% 1.416 .083 
a
 Significance levels are one-tailed. 
b
 Disclosure groups are separated at the mean disclosure score for the respective year. 
  
 
Table 4.4 (2012) and Table 4.5 (2014) report the results of our regression analysis 
controlling for other impact factors. As indicated in Table 4.4, AC code is the only 
explanatory variable significantly associated with 2012 CARs, suggesting that the other 
potential impact factors did not influence investor concerns at the time of the first TI 
release.  Overall, the model explains only a modest 6.3 percent of the variation in the 
market reactions.  In contrast, results of the regression analysis for the 2014 CARs
13
 
(Table 4.5) indicate the model explains 27.7% of the variation in the observations.  
Further, in addition to AC code (significant at p = .027, one-tailed), all the three control 
                                                 
13
 We exclude the outlier value for this estimation. 
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variables are also statistically significant (at p = .005 or better). One possible 
explanation for the difference in the relation for the control variables in the second 
analysis is that investors became savvier to the threats of corruption exposures 
following the issuance of the first report.  More importantly, the results of the regression 
analyses controlling for other factors provide additional support for the argument that 
investors interpret better AC disclosure as leading to reduced exposure to the potential 
regulatory cost threats arising from the issuance of the TI reports.   
 
Table 4.4. Regression results for tests of the relation between 2012 CARs and AC 
Disclosure, controlling for other factors. 
Sample size is 39. 
Adj. R
2
 = .063 F-statistic = 1.636 Significance of F-stat = .188 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Relation 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
t-statistic 
Significance of 
t-statistic
a
 
Constant None -0.117 -1.583 .123 
AC Code (+) 0.017 2.221 .033 
IndRisk (-) -0.005 0.484 .632 
Size None 0.012 1.292 .205 
MediaExp (-) -0.005 -0.530 .600 
a
  Significance levels are one-tailed for the AC CODE, IndRisk, and MediaExp 
variables. 
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Table 4.5. Regression results for tests of the relation between 2014 CARs and AC 
Disclosure, controlling for other factors. 
Sample size is 42
14
  
Adj. R
2
 = .277 F-statistic = 4.928 Significance of F-stat = .003 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Relation 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
t-statistic 
Significance of 
t-statistic
a
 
Constant None -0.140 -1.583 .005 
AC Code (+) 0.012  2.221 .027 
IndRisk (-) -0.022 -3.005 .003 
Size None 0.017  2.953 .005 
MediaExp (-) -0.018 -3.018 .003 
a
  Significance levels are one-tailed for the AC CODE, IndRisk, and MediaExp 
variables. 
 
Further Analysis 
 In addition to the AC scores provided in each of the TI reports, the organization 
also includes an overall transparency score, based partly on the anti-corruption 
disclosures, and partly on other factors.  It is necessary, therefore, to assure that the 
differences in market reaction we document are not due to the transparency ratings 
rather than the AC disclosure.  Because the two metrics are highly correlated (Pearson 
product-moment correlation of 0.616 in 2012 and 0.772 in 2014), including the measure 
as an additional variable in the regression models is problematic.  Instead, we re-run our 
tests using the transparency scores rather than the AC scores to differentiate our sample 
and find no statistically significant differences in mean CARs across better and worse 
transparency score groups for either 2012 or 2014.
15
  Similarly, regression results using 
the transparency score code instead of AC code yield no statistically significant 
relations for the replacement variable (and other variable relations remain qualitatively 
                                                 
14
 One observation was withdrawn from the initial sample due to being a strong outlier. 
15
 This holds for 2014 with or without including the outlier observation. 
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unchanged).  These additional tests add further credence to our claims that it is the 
difference in AC disclosure driving differences in the market reaction. 
 We also concede that, for the 2014 analysis, investors could focus on the change 
in AC scores themselves relative to 2012 as opposed to the levels.  We first address this 
issue by calculating the change in AC scores for the sample companies with 
observations from both periods, and including this metric as an additional control 
variable in the regression analysis.  Results indicate the change in score variable, 
although positively signed, is not significant at conventional levels.  Further, with the 
change in score measure included, all of the additional explanatory variables remain 
statistically significant at p < .05.  Finally, because the change in score metric is 
significantly correlated with the AC code variable (Pearson product-moment correlation 
of 0.371, p = .020), we also estimate the regression replacing AC code with the changes 
measure, and find the association with CARs is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Thus, our primary results do not appear to be influenced by the 
changes in AC scores. 
4.7. Conclusion 
 A number of prior studies provide evidence that investors react negatively to 
environmental-related events that potentially increase the political and social cost 
exposure of affected firms (e.g., Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Blacconiere and 
Notrthcut, 1997; Bowen et al., 1983). We extend this stream of research by exploring 
the market reaction to a non-environmental action with potential regulatory cost 
exposure threats – the issuance of TI’s first-ever corporate-level reports related to 
corruption. TI is widely recognized as the premier organization engaged in the fight 
against corruption, and as such, we anticipate that investors might assume the release of 
the company-level reports will lead firms included to incur future costs to improve their 
anti-corruption efforts, communicate those actions, and/or participate in social and 
political debate regarding the issue.  Using event study methods and focusing on only 
the U.S. companies included in the two reports, we find evidence consistent with the 
prior environmental-based studies.  The average market reaction to the release of the 
first TI report was negative and statistically significant.  Further, the market response 
was significantly less negative for firms rated by TI as having better than average anti-
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corruption disclosure, a factor we argue signals lower levels of exposure to the 
regulatory cost threats.  Although the mean CAR surrounding the release of the second 
report is not statistically significant, we document that better AC disclosure is again 
significantly and positively related to differences in the reaction, controlling for other 
impact factors.  Thus, it appears that the market is savvy to political cost exposures 
within the social, as well as, the environmental domain.   
 While our results shed light on investor perceptions of regulatory cost threats, 
they also suggest that TI’s strategy could prove beneficial in the fight against 
corruption.  As noted by Wang and Rosenau (2001), TI’s politics of shame center on 
raising attention to the issue of corruption, and the negative investor response to that 
attention would appear likely to induce management at impacted firms to address their 
corruption exposures.  To the extent that this in turn leads to improvements in the anti-
corruption efforts, the TI strategy would seem to be effective.  However, in that TI has 
made the choice to focus largely on the AC disclosure of the firms it evaluates, a less 
promising outcome is also possible.  Considerable research in the environmental 
disclosure domain documents a negative relation between corporate environmental 
performance and environmental disclosure (e.g. Patten, 2002b; Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Cho et al., 2012). Worse performers appear to use disclosure 
to reduce the exposures to social and political pressure arising from the poorer 
performance.  Accordingly, rather than actually improving anti-corruption programs 
and efforts, corporations might instead choose to only change their disclosure, an act 
that would likely yield far fewer benefits in the fight against corruption.  Which 
scenario plays out can only be determined by future investigation.    
 As with all studies, ours is subject to limitations.  We limit our analysis to a 
restricted sample of U.S. companies, and as such cannot generalize how our results 
would hold across firms in other countries where attitudes toward corruption issues, as 
well as concerns with regulatory cost exposures may differ.  Our reliance on market 
model methods means that we treat shareholders as a uniform group of investors with 
homogeneous beliefs about the value of social and political exposures and the role of 
disclosure in reducing those impacts. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) argue that prices 
responses to new information likely depends on the firm's net organizational capital and 
on the nature of its stakeholders, and as such it would be interesting to explore if, and 
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how, the differences in stakeholder power  influence market reactions in the regulatory 
cost setting.  Finally, our investigation is limited to the impact of the TI firm-level 
reports on shareholders only.  Certainly, other stakeholder groups would likely respond 
to the assessments provided by TI, and exploring both what those reactions are, and 
how they impact corporate response could prove likewise enlightening.   
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APPENDIX 4.1 
 
SAMPLE COMPANIES 2012 
 
SAMPLE COMPANIES 2014 
3M 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES  
AMAZON.COM  
AMGEN  
APPLE  
AT&T  
BANK OF AMERICA  
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 'A'  
CHEVRON  
CISCO SYSTEMS  
CITIGROUP 
COCA COLA  
CONOCOPHILLIPS  
EXXON MOBIL  
GENERAL ELECTRIC  
GOLDMAN SACHS GP.  
GOOGLE 'A'  
HEWLETT-PACKARD  
HOME DEPOT  
INTEL  
INTERNATIONAL BUS.MCHS.  
JOHNSON & JOHNSON  
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.  
MCDONALDS  
MERCK & COMPANY  
MICROSOFT  
OCCIDENTAL PTL.  
ORACLE  
PEPSICO  
PFIZER  
PHILIP MORRIS INTL.  
PROCTER & GAMBLE  
QUALCOMM  
UNITED PARCEL SER.'B'  
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES  
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS  
VISA 'A'  
WAL MART STORES  
WALT DISNEY  
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
3M  
ABBOTT LABORATORIES  
AMAZON.COM  
AMGEN  
APPLE  
AT&T  
BANK OF AMERICA  
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 'A'  
CHEVRON  
CISCO SYSTEMS  
CITIGROUP 
COCA COLA  
CONOCOPHILLIPS  
EXXON MOBIL  
GENERAL ELECTRIC  
GOLDMAN SACHS GP.  
GOOGLE 'A'  
HEWLETT-PACKARD  
HOME DEPOT  
INTEL  
INTERNATIONAL BUS.MCHS.  
JOHNSON & JOHNSON  
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.  
MCDONALDS  
MERCK & COMPANY  
MICROSOFT  
OCCIDENTAL PTL.  
ORACLE  
PEPSICO  
PFIZER  
PHILIP MORRIS INTL.  
PROCTER & GAMBLE  
QUALCOMM  
UNITED PARCEL SER.'B'  
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES  
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS  
VISA 'A'  
WAL MART STORES  
WALT DISNEY  
COMCAST 'A'  
GILEAD SCIENCES  
NEWS 'A' 
WELLS FARGO & CO  
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CHAPTER 5 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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5.1.  Conclusions 
 This thesis focuses in investigating anti-corruption (AC) disclosure practices, 
possible drivers of this type of social disclosure and consequences arising from it.  
 The first paper (presented in Section 2) explores how Siemens A.G – a large 
multinational company – used disclosure as a reaction to an external event. The study 
analyzes the trends in Siemens’ disclosures on compliance and AC over a period of 
eleven years (2000-2011), during which the company was found to have paid bribes of 
around $1.4 billion and consequently ordered to pay a total of $1.6 billion in related 
fines. Results document a significant increase in the volume and breadth of compliance 
and AC disclosure in annual and sustainability reports starting in the year when the first 
corruption scandal occurred (2006).  Additionally evidence shows that disclosure 
increased again the following year (when the first fine was charged against the 
company), and peaked in 2008, the year of the final settlement. Analysis of the 
disclosure across this period indicates attempts at both substantive and symbolic 
legitimation.  For example, although Siemens had claimed in prior reporting to be 
engaged in the fight against corruption, it was only following the scandal that the 
company included specific disclosure of new compliance and anti-corruption 
procedures such as creating training programs, monitors, and watchdogs.  Post-event 
disclosure of a symbolic nature included, for example, references to the company’s 
association with the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). Finally, the study also 
provides evidence showing that increased media attention concerning Siemens’ 
corruption scandal led to increased AC disclosure.  Overall, the results indicate that 
legitimacy theory and media agenda setting theory, both of which have been shown to 
explain environmental disclosure, appear also to apply to the AC disclosure setting. 
 The second paper, presented in Section 3, addresses board characteristics as a 
factor influencing AC disclosure and uses a frame of analysis combining stakeholder-
agency (SAT) and resource dependence (RDT) theories. Results show that certain board 
characteristics appeared to explain differences in AC disclosure by large multinational 
companies. Consistent with SAT, our results show that companies with a higher 
proportion of independent board members disclose more on their AC practices. Aligned 
with RDT, results also show that the proportion of community influential board 
members (academics, government members, or NGO’s board members) is positively 
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and significantly related to levels of AC disclosure and though not very strongly, so 
does gender. In contrast to our expectations, neither the existence of a CSR Committee 
on the board nor being a signatory to the UNGC, were statistically significant in 
explaining differences in AC disclosure at conventional levels.  
 Paper three examines investors response to the issuance of Transparency 
International’s (TI) 2012 and 2014 "Transparency in Corporate Reporting: Assessing 
the World’s Largest Companies" reports (see Section 4).  Building on prior studies of 
political cost-inducing events in the environmental domain, we anticipated a negative 
market reaction to the issuance of TI reports, although we argue that the adjustment will 
be less severe for firms rated as having better AC disclosure. Focusing on a sample of 
U.S companies to control for country-level effects and to allow for comparison with the 
prior environmental-themed studies, document a significantly negative market reaction 
to the first TI report issuance.  Although also negative, the market reaction to the 2014 
report was not statistically significant.  However, we also document that, as expected, 
market adjustments differ significantly across sub-groups based on AC disclosure in 
both time periods.  These results hold controlling for other factors potentially 
influencing investor perceptions of exposure to the report issuances.  In general, our 
results are consistent with the prior studies and suggest the market is savvy to political 
cost exposures arising from non-environmental events.  
5.2. Theoretical and managerial implications 
 The three papers presented in this thesis are deemed to provide relevant 
empirical and theoretical contributions regarding AC disclosure, factors influencing the 
practice, and possible consequences arising from it. 
 First, the three papers presented in the thesis provide empirical evidence 
regarding corporate anti-corruption disclosure, which is consensually considered a 
topical (KPMG, 2013; Donadelli et al., 2014; Transparency International, 2014; UNGC, 
2015) and under-researched theme (Branco and Delgado, 2012; Donadelli et al., 2014) 
in CSR. Furthermore, two of the studies, Papers 1 and 3, extend the abundant prior 
literature examining, largely, environmental events and disclosure, and the results 
indicate consistency with the findings of those prior studies.  
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 Second, the results of the three papers are likely to be relevant for several key 
corporate stakeholders: 
 Governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the fight 
against corruption could use the results to argue for increased regulation to 
ensure that adequate levels of this important type of social disclosure are not 
totally dependent on manager’s discretionary decisions. 
 The studies should allow managers to enrich their understanding of AC 
disclosure practices, causes, and consequences. For example, the evidence in 
Paper 1 on how Siemens A.G. used substantive and symbolic legitimacy 
management strategies when faced with a corruption–related scandal could 
assist managers in dealing with their own social exposures. Further, because 
AC-related decisions are more and more being emanated by the board of 
directors, results of Paper 2 could help managers understand how specific board 
characteristics may be influencing their own board’s perception (and requests) 
regarding anti-corruption. Finally, the results of paper 3 can provide managers 
with a better understanding of how investors view both political cost exposures 
and the potential for tools such as good AC disclosure to address the concerns. 
 The results of the studies may also allow investors to gain a better perspective 
of AC disclosure practices, influences, and consequences, which may help them 
to better use that information in their investment decisions.  
 Third, the papers provide a significant theoretical contribution in that they 
appear to validate the explanatory power of specific theories to explain a range of social 
disclosure beyond the environmental domain. More specifically, legitimacy and media 
agenda setting theory proved useful in explaining Siemens’ AC disclosure practices as a 
reaction to a corruption related event, while the relation between certain aspects of 
board characteristics and AC disclosure were consistent with the arguments of 
stakeholder agency theory combined with resource dependence theory.  
5.3. Limitations and future research 
 As with all research, the studies comprising this thesis are subject to limitations.  
Because Paper 1 is a case study and Papers 2 and 3 rely on relatively small samples, 
how well the results generalize to larger populations cannot be determined.  Further, all 
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of the sample companies included in the studies are very large multi-national firms, and 
while corruption risks are likely high for these companies, they also exist for firms of all 
sizes.  Examining whether the causes and consequences of AC disclosure hold across 
other samples would therefore be potentially enlightening.  Further, and again an issue 
of generalizability, Paper 3 examines only the U.S. investor response to the release of 
TI’s firm-level reports.  And while there is the belief that that was important in order to 
control for potential differences in country-level attitudes toward corruption and to 
allow for meaningful comparison with prior studies, exploring whether investors in 
other regions of the world similarly appear to value negatively the exposure to 
corruption-related risks would make for an interesting extension of Paper 3.   
 A second broad limitation related to both Paper 2 and Paper 3 is their reliance on 
the TI assessments of AC disclosure.  One of the strengths of the body of environmental 
disclosure research is the existence of a broad set of alternative disclosure schemes that 
have been used in assessing differences in the extent and quality of information being 
provided.  When theoretical claims such as those under legitimacy theory are shown to 
hold in studies with alternative disclosure metrics, the validity of the arguments is 
strengthened.  No such variety exists to date in AC disclosure work, and as such, 
development and testing using alternative metrics would be valuable.   
 Finally, while the studies in this thesis shed light on AC disclosure, its causes, 
and its consequences, an unexplored question is whether AC disclosure actually leads to 
positive social benefits.  While TI, the UNGC, and other organizations clearly believe 
that better disclosure can help lead to reduced corruption activities, that link is not 
explored in this thesis.  Unfortunately, as evidenced in much environmental-themed 
research, an alternative possibility is that companies may use AC disclosure as a way of 
reducing their exposure to the social and political pressures arising from corruption 
exposures, and as such, rather than leading to better corruption performance, the 
disclosure may instead allow practices themselves to go unchanged.  Future research 
needs to carefully explore, therefore, how AC disclosure actually relates to companies’ 
AC practices.   
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